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This project explores the possibility of applying a contract-type based strategy to 
manage acquisition program costs and schedule risks for the South African (SA) 
Department of Defense (DOD). The hypothesis proposes a strategy that consists of the 
wide variety of contract types for use within the acquisition process. The emphasis is on 
the application of incentive fees and award fees. The study analyzed three past programs 
and one current program from the SA DOD to establish a rationale for considering the 
application of the incentive and award fees for contract types as a risk mitigation plan. An 
analysis of three similar U.S. DOD programs that also implemented incentive and award 
fees based on contract type indicated that from a risk management perspective, the 
application of contract type is not inconsequential but the risks are manageable. In order 
to facilitate the application of this strategy, we find it is necessary to adapt regulations 
such as Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act (PPPFA) and Public Financial 
Management Act (PFMA) and directive documents such as A-PRAC-1034. Further 
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Risk management is a critical focus of defense acquisition programs. Unstable 
government funding, the need to deliver capabilities to soldiers on time, and an increase 
in technological complexity of defense systems necessitate the implementation of 
effective risk management. According to Rendon & Snider (2008) acquisition program 
managers’ responsibility and the application of the acquisition process to defense 
acquisition programs are to mitigate cost, schedule and technical performance risks. 
Therefore, risk management is applied through all phases of the acquisition process. 
However, Rendon and Snider (2008) further state that the level of risk decreases as the 
program progresses from the early to the last phases of the program life cycle because 
technological maturity increases. 
The South African (SA) Department of Defence (DOD) acquisition environment 
implements risk management for acquisition programs as provided by the risk 
management plan document prepared for each program. The SA DOD Military Standard 
3 (RSA-MIL-STD-3) document specifies acquisition phases in which a risk management 
plan is mandatory. According to RSA-MIL-STD-3, the risk management plan is required 
for the approval of each baseline from the Functional Baseline (FBL), and is listed as 
Category I (C1) element of the program baseline elements. This means a risk 
management plan is mandatory for each phase of the acquisition processes from the 
concept phase. Category I elements are those baseline elements that are deemed critical 
for risks control, and the baseline is rejected when these elements are not satisfactory to 
the SA DOD. Furthermore, RSA-MIL-STD-3 stipulates the United States (U.S.) Defense 
System Management College (DSMC) Risk Management Guide for DOD Acquisition, as 
the document to be used as guide for the development of the risk management plan (SA 
Department of Defence, 2007a).  
The Defense Systems Management College (1989) states that proper risk 
management requires a systematic approach to the identification of all those factors that 
poses a risk to the acquisition program. The Defense Systems Management College 
(1989) further state that while many program managers may use intuitive reasoning as a 
 2 
starting point in risk management, it is important that the manager goes beyond an 
intuitive approach for decisions that involve significant risks. For example, a program 
manager should identify root cause, probability and consequence, and effect on program 
performance. If the consequence is such that it causes the entire program to fail, then the 
risk cannot be accepted (Defense Systems Management College, 1989). In the modern 
defense acquisition environment, the survival of a program depends on understanding 
these factors and their potential impact on overall performance, including cost and 
schedule. 
The U.S. DOD risk management process has not significantly changed overtime, 
although the specific program risk mitigation techniques have evolved. In 1989, the U.S. 
DSMC released a risk management guide in response to a Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) report on assessment of the U.S. DOD technical risk management efforts. 
The risk management guide was centered on two points, in addition to the fact that that 
program management is a risk management technique. The guide emphasized that risk 
management does not only require technical risks to be managed, but includes the 
management of schedule risk, cost risk, supportability risk, and programmatic risks 
(DSMC, 1989). It also underlined that the situations in which risk management effort are 
performed are different. Therefore, each situation or defense acquisition program will 
require a slightly different approach (DSMC, 1989). 
With the view that risk management extends beyond the management of technical 
risks, the DSMC provides five facets of risk necessary to manage the overall program 
performance issues. These are technical, supportability, programmatic, cost, and schedule 
risks (1989). Furthermore, the DSMC guide (1989, p. 3–3) states that “Cost and schedule 
risks are somewhat differently than the other three in that they are (more or less) 
indicators of program status.” The technical and supportability risk affects performance, 
while programmatic risks are controlled by environment (DSMC, 1989). Therefore, there 
are few risk management techniques that directly address cost and schedule risk in 
program management. However, cost overruns and schedule delays can become a major 
source of overall program performance risks. 
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In recent approaches to risk management, U.S. DOD does acknowledge the 
management and treatment of cost and schedule risks, as opposed to treating these risks 
only as indicators of program status. The Risk Management Guide for DOD Acquisition 
of 2006 provides the general structure and baseline for conducting risk management. 
However, it does not prescribe any specific method or tool for mitigating any kind of 
risk. The guide suggests a risk management process, shown in Figure 1, for continuously 
identifying and measuring risks throughout the acquisition process. The process consists 
of key activities for risk management. The activities are Risk Identification, Risk 
Analysis, Risk Mitigation Planning, Risk Mitigation Plan Implementation, and Risk 
Tracking. The guide also provides characteristics of successful risk management 
approaches such as integration of System Engineering Process (SEP) and Test and 
Evaluation Management Plan (TEMP) within the acquisition process (U.S. Department of 
Defense, 2006). These risk management key activities are described, and applied 
to various SA DOD acquisition programs in Chapter III and Chapter IV, respectively.  
Figure 1.  Risk-Management Process. Source: U.S. 
Department of Defense (2006). 
Acquisition programs rely heavily on systems engineering technical processes as 
techniques to mitigate risks in complex programs with extensive development efforts (SA 
Department of Defence, 2010; and U.S. Department of Defense, 2015). System engineering 
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techniques includes models such as V-model and IEEE systems-engineering process 
(Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2011). These techniques are not only used in mitigating risks that 
are technical in nature, but indirectly control the resulting cost overruns and schedule 
slippage (Rendon & Snider, 2008). Nevertheless, the U.S. Defense Acquisition Guidebook 
(DAG) emphasizes the integration of system engineering processes with risk management 
implementation (U.S. Department of Defense, 2013).  
The SA DOD acquisition environment implements systems engineering processes 
for acquisition programs as provided and approved by the System Engineering 
Management Plan (SEMP). As with the risk management plan, the SEMP is considered 
categorized as a C1 element and it is required for all phases of the acquisition process 
starting from the concept phase as required by RSA-MIL-STD 3 (SA Department of 
Defence, 2007a). SA DOD acquisition policy and process guidelines in the Defence 
Acquisition Policy 1000 (DAP 1000) stipulates and emphasizes that all systems should be 
acquired in accordance to the system engineering process in order to mitigate the risks. It 
further states that, although DAP 1000 does not specify a system engineering process, the 
following engineering principles should be incorporated into the SEMP (SA Department of 
Defence, 2010):  
 
 Systems Hierarchy 
 Work Breakdown Structures 
 Requirements Management 
 Technical Baseline Management 
 Specification Practices 
 Risk Management 
 Quality Management 
 Configuration Management 
 Design and Development 
 Logistics Engineering 
 Life Cycle Integrated Logistic Support (ILS) 
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 Reliability and Maintainability Management 
 Safety of Systems Management 
 Test, Evaluation and Technical performance 
A further approach to mitigate overall acquisition program risks is the use of the 
contracting management strategy, specifically the selected contract-type. The approach 
determines what contract-type to select, whether a cost or a fixed type, at a particular 
phase of the acquisition program, depending on the level of risks (Butler & Land, 2005). 
For example, an Integrated Program Team (IPT) may select a cost type contract during 
the early phases of the program because the requirement is broad, the technological 
solution is uncertain; therefore the risks level is high. A fixed type contract may be 
selected at the later phases because the risks level is low (Sanders, Lobkovsky, Meitiv, 
McCormick, McQuade, & Nzeribe, 2015). 
Rendon and Snider (2008) and PMBOK (2004) presented a risk management 
process with different but similar logic key activities as the ones provided in DOD risk 
management guide. In the risk response planning phase of risk management process, 
Rendon and Snider (2008) uses contract-type as a technique to transfer the program cost 
risk impact between different parties in the acquisition program. In a typical situation, 
Rendon and Snider (2008, p. 133) states that “This is typically arranged between the 
government and the prime contractor or between the prime contractor and its 
subcontractors.”  
Furthermore, this technique involves paying the cost risk premium to the party 
assuming the risk as a means to compensation. Figure 2 demonstrates how this technique is 
applied. Contract-types include cost-plus fixed fee (CPFF), cost-plus award fee (CPAF), 
cost-plus incentive fee (CPIF), fixed-price incentive (FPI), fixed-price with economic price 




Figure 2.  Relationship between Contract type, Requirement, and Risk. 
Source: Rendon and Snider (2008). 
As mentioned, the SA DOD acquisition organization also applies systems 
engineering processes to mitigate acquisition program risks and improve performance 
(SA Department of Defence, 2003). There has never been an emphasis on reviewing the 
effect of the contracting strategy, specifically the selected contract-type in relation to 
other types of risks, specifically cost overruns and schedule slippage. The goal of this 
project is to analyze the effect of contract-type strategy on SA DOD acquisition 
programs.  
A. OBJECTIVE 
The South African DOD has a formal acquisition process, which is used to 
manage the acquisition programs. The process delivers matured defense systems to the 
South African National Defence Force (SANDF). Figure 3 shows the acquisition process 
chart for this process, within the context of the system life cycle phases, milestones, and 
systems engineering technical reviews and configuration baselines as presented in DAP 
1000 (SA Department of Defence, 2010).  
The objective of this project is to propose a standard contract-type strategy for 
various phases of the SA DOD acquisition process. It is based on understanding the 
relationship between requirement certainty and risk. The strategy will provide for each 
particular phase of the acquisition process a recommended contract-type, either cost 
reimbursement or fixed type contracts. The strategy will thus be a risk mitigation 




Figure 3.  South African DOD Acquisition Process. 
Source: SA Department of Defence. (2010). 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The SA DOD measures the performance in acquisition activities during a 
particular Financial Year (FY) using cash flow of funds allocated to programs. Higher 
cash flow out of the program to the contractors most likely represents desired and good 
performance, while low cash flow most likely represents poor performance. This 
conception assumes that the technical performance is acceptable prior to the payment to 
the contractor. This in turn depends largely on the ability and capacity of the contractors 
to deliver on the contracted output.  
Figure 4 shows the cash flow performance of various categories of acquisition 
programs managed by SA DOD during 2014/15 FY (Armscor Annual Report 2014/15, 




Figure 4.  South African DOD Acquisition Cash Flow Performance for 2014/
2015 FY. Source: Armscor Annual Report 2014/15 (2015). 
The data shows that for all the program categories in the particular year, the actual 
cash flow is less the planned cash flow. In many cases, the difference in actual cash flow 
from the planned cash flow may lead to cost overruns and schedule slippage.  
Table 1 shows the description, schedule and cost performance status for two SA 
DOD acquisition programs, Project Swatch and Project Porthole during FY 2013. The 
status was reported by the news article from defenceweb.com. The third column indicates 
that projects Swatch and Porthole are 36 months and 34 months behind schedule. The 
fourth column shows funds that were supposed to be committed to these programs within 
the specified period. The report further stated that the SA DOD has acknowledged to the 
Minister of Defence that there are few other programs that involve the provision of 
equipment to the deployed soldiers that are behind schedule (Politicsweb.com, 2013). 
This may lead to overall program schedule slippage.  
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Table 1.   Status of Some SA DOD Acquisition Programs. Source: 
Politcsweb.com. (2013). 
 Program 
Name  Description  “Schedule Slip”  Financial Cost 
 “Project 
Swatch” 
 Acquisition of a “transportable 
camping system.” 36 months 




 Acquisition of a “high altitude 
parachute system.” 34 months 
 R97 000 000 remains 
uncommitted  
The risk management identification and analysis phases of the risk management 
process should have revealed the schedule and cost risks associated with these programs 
(Rendon & Snider, 2008). 
The U.S. DOD uses Earned Value Management (EVM) to quantitatively address 
problems associated with tying technical performance, cash flow, and schedule. An EVM 
is defined by the U.S. Department of Defense Earned Value Management System 
Interpretation Guide as 
An EVM System (EVMS) is the management control system that 
integrates a program’s work scope, schedule, and cost parameters for 
optimum program planning and control. To be useful as a program 
management tool, program managers must incorporate EVM into their 
acquisition decision-making processes; the EVM performance data 
generated by the EVMS must be timely, accurate, reliable, and auditable; 
and the EVMS must be implemented in a disciplined manner consistent 
with the 32 EVMS Guidelines. (U.S. Department of Defense, 2015a, p. 5) 
The problem addressed in this project is; although the SA DOD applies system 
engineering processes successfully in mitigating technical risks, there are still cost 
overruns and schedule slippage. In view of the performance outcomes of some of the past 
and current SA defense acquisition programs, there is a legitimate necessity to examine a 
different risk mitigation technique to reduce overall risks. This project explores the 
possibility of applying the contract-type strategy, specifically the incentive and award fee 
contracts in mitigating overall risks. 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research questions addressed are, how can the contract-type based contracting 
strategy be implemented in mitigating program risks in the SA defense acquisition 
programs should this strategy be implemented in order to avoid acquisition program risks 
that lead to costs overruns and schedule delays, and what are the risk consequences if this 
strategy is not applied? 
D. SCOPE 
The contract-type strategy proposed in this project is intended to apply to any SA 
DOD acquisition program that implements the acquisition process shown in Figure 3. 
However, the strategy is tested using three past and one current acquisition programs. 
Therefore, the project does not provide the details on how the strategy should be 
integrated within a particular SA DOD programs, but only sets the conditions and 
predicts the possible overall performance improvement on future programs.  
E. METHODOLOGY 
This project begins by discussing some of important concepts of defense 
acquisition risk management, contract management and acquisition management 
concepts available in literature, with the focus on contract-types strategies. It then 
introduces the SA DOD acquisition process, its supporting policies and practices. A 
standard contract-type strategy for the SA DOD acquisition is proposed. The project then 
applies the contract-type strategy to past and current SA DOD programs as a technique to 
mitigate cost and schedule risks, and provides the analysis thereafter. The project the uses 
three similar U.S. DOD acquisition that applies contract-type strategy to test if there is a 
link between the contract-type selected and the acquisition program success, as proposed 
for the SA DOD. Finally, the project provides recommendations and proposes future 
work that can be undertaken.  
F. REPORT ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II provides the literature review, which reflects on concepts and previous 
endeavors in the field of risk management, contract management, U.S. DOD acquisition 
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process and SA DOD acquisition process. Chapter III presents the proposed contracting 
strategy for the SA DOD acquisition process. Chapter IV presents the analysis of three 
past and one current SA DOD programs, and how the proposed could be used to mitigate 
program risks. This chapter is tailored to the system elements that apply to risk and 
contract management. Chapter V presents an analysis of three U.S. DOD programs that 
applies contract-type strategy to test if one current SA DOD acquisition program, and 
applies the risk management process in order to test if there is a link between the 
contract-type selected and the acquisition program success. Chapter VI provides the 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Most DOD acquisition systems around the world recognize risk management as 
important to acquisition program success (U.S. Department of Defense, 2013; SA 
Department of Defence, 2010; and Kausal & Markowski, 2000). Risk management is 
therefore as a function, generally integrated within the acquisition processes of most 
DODs. Although the approaches may differ, the structures of risk management processes 
are generally similar. In this chapter, a general overarching structure of risk management 
process is reviewed along with common terminology, techniques, and issues, as applied 
across some of the DOD acquisition programs. The chapter also reviews contract-type 
strategies, viewed as part of the government contract management framework. Finally, an 
overview of the SA DOD acquisition process is addressed.  
A. RISK MANAGEMENT 
According to the U.S. DOD risk management guide, risk is defined as  
a measure of future uncertainties in achieving program performance goals 
and objectives within defined cost, schedule and performance constraints. 
Risk can be associated with all aspects of a program (e.g., threat, 
technology maturity, supplier capability, design maturation, performance 
against plan). (U.S. Department of Defense, 2006, p. 1) 
Furthermore, the guide states that “Risk management is the overarching process 
that encompasses identification, analysis, mitigation planning, mitigation plan 
implementation, and tracking. Risk management should begin at the earliest stages of 
program planning and continue throughout the total life-cycle of the program.” (U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2006, p. 1). A risk is different from an issue in that an issue is the 
measure of an event that has already occurred. The U.S. DOD risk management guide 
states about how a risk differs from an issue as  
An important difference between issue management and risk management 
is that issue management applies resources to address and resolve current 
issues or problems, while risk management applies resources to mitigate 
future potential root causes and their consequences. (U.S. Department of 
Defense, 2006, p. 1)   
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The DSMC (1986) states the factors that can be a source of risk such as 
technology, contract management issues, engineering design issues etc. Chapter I 
mentioned that in its 1989 risk management guide, the U.S. DOD specified six facets of 
risk, namely: technical, programmatic, supportability, cost, and schedule risks. Table 2 
depicts an example from each facet of risk (DSMC, 1989). Each list is not exhaustive.  
 Technical risk—A technical risk is defined as risk associated with new 
design or technology implemented in order to increase the level of 
performance. Typically, technical risks are due to requirements for greater 
system performance. 
 Programmatic risk—A programmatic risk is related to those factors 
involving the provision and use of certain resources and activities that are 
outside program control, but has potential to disrupt the program. The 
examples are the interruption by decision made at higher level of 
authority, interruption by an event not directly related to the program, or 
interruption caused by imperfect capabilities.  
 Supportability risks—Supportability risks involve those risks associated 
with fielding the system being developed, such as logistic support, training 
etc. 
 Cost and schedule risk—A cost and schedule risk mean potential of cost 
and schedule growth. These risks are a function of IPT ability to manage 
technical, programmatic and supportability risks. As it was mentioned in 
Chapter I, most risk management techniques are developed to directly 
address technical, programmatic and supportability risks, in anticipation to 










Table 2.   Examples of Risks by Facets. Adapted from Defense Systems 






























































According to U.S. DOD risk management guide (U.S. Department of Defense, 
2006), risks have three components: a future root cause, probability, and consequence. A 
future root cause is a factor or component of the risk that when corrected, would prevent 
the risk from occurring. A risk is most of time due to the future root cause. As defined by 
the U.S. Department of Defense (2006), a probability is the likelihood of future root 
cause occurring measured at present time. A consequence is the impact of that future root 
cause on cost, schedule, and technical performance (Department of Defense, 2006).  
According to Ketzer (2006), conceptually the project risk can be represented as a 
function of both probability and the consequence as: 
Riske = f (probability, consequence) 
This representation of risk leads to assigning individual risks a numerical level, in 
order to classify the extent of the likelihood and the impact on the program performance 
parameters (For example, schedule and costs). This method is termed “qualitative risk-
analysis” (Rendon & Snider, 2008). In Chapters IV and V, this method is applied to SA 
DOD acquisition programs to analyze schedule and costs risks.  
Figure 1 showed the risk management process as described by the U.S. DOD Risk 
Management Guide. In this section prior to describing each risk management activity in 
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the process, the depiction by Rene and Rendon (2008), and PMBOK (2004) is provided 
in Figure 5. The concept and principle of both processes are similar.  
 
Figure 5.  Risk-Management Process. Source: Rendon and Snider (2008). 
1. Risk Management Planning 
The initial activity on the risk management involves planning. This activity 
involves making decisions on how to approach risk management for a specific program. 
The approach includes specifying the risk levels, type, and the extent which the visibility 
is required for different risks. The popular project management tools used to achieve 
these activities is project scope, project Work Breakdown Structure (WBS), and risk 
WBS. The project scope covers all aspects that relate to project objectives, deliverables, 
cost, and schedule estimates. These aspects in turn determine the approach, risk levels, 
type, and the extent to which the visibility is required (PMBOK, 2004).  
The Project WBS is used to decompose project expected deliverables and 
functions into categories and subcategories. Furthermore, the WBS is used to assign tasks 
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to different IPT members, make budget and schedule estimates etc. Risk WBS follows 
project WBS, it is used to decompose risks into categories and subcategories based on 
risk level, type, and the level of visibility. Risk WBS categories can also be based on 
technology, environment, organization, and requirement. After the approach to risk 
management to a specific program is determined, it is documented into a risk 
management plan prior to entering the next activity (Rendon & Snider, 2008) and 
(PMBOK, 2004).  
2. Risk Identification 
Risk identification involves identifying and documenting all the risks that have 
the potential to affect the program, and their characteristics. These include risks that 
affect program performance objectives such as cost, schedule, and technical objectives. 
Risks are identified by analyzing and going through the elements and information 
obtained from the project scope, project WBS, and risk WBS produced from risk 
management planning phase. As with the risk management planning phase, the risks are 
identified from the phase, and the characteristics are documented in the risk management 
plan. Risk identification processes should be continuously performed, because as the new 
information on the program is obtained, the level of uncertainty and risk might change 
(Rendon & Snider, 2008). 
3. Risk Analysis 
Risk Analysis entails determining the extent of the impact to which the risks 
identified from the previous phase have on program performance objectives, by 
determining the risk level. The impact is evaluated for cost, schedule and technical 
performance objectives. As mentioned, the risk level is a function of risk estimated 
likelihood and consequence. For formality and traceability purposes, it is important that 
the risk level is developed using systematic and possibly an objective approach.  
Rendon and Snider (2008) described two types of risk analysis, qualitative and 
quantitative analysis. Qualitative analysis is based on detail analysis and assessment of 
the root causes of the risks identified, and therefore allocating an appropriate risk level as 
either low, medium or high. Johnson and Birkler (1996) illustrated how a qualitative 
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analysis was used as part of risk management in the acquisition of U.S. DOD FA-18E/F, 
F-22, and RAH-66 programs. A method for analyzing and assessing the root cause of the 
risk begin by directly extracting each specific risk from the risk WBS, and develop a 
required pair of numeric values representing the risk estimated likelihood and the 
consequence. These values are usually a whole number. They are plotted on the risk 
matrix (shown in Figure 6) used to determine the risk level (U.S. Department of Defense, 
2006).  
To assign an estimated likelihood value, for each risk ask what is the probability 
of the risk event to occur. As shown in Table 3, likelihood values are based on a range 
from 1 to 5. The value 1 represents not likely with the probability of 10%, and value 5 
represents near certainty with the probability of 90% (U.S. Department of Defense, 
2006).  
Table 3.   Risk Likelihood Values. Adapted from 
U.S. Department of Defense (2006). 
Value/level Likelihood Probability of occurrence 
1 Not likely ~10 
2 Low likely ~30 
3 Likely ~50 
4 Highly likely ~70 
5 Near certain ~90 
 
To assign a value on the consequence or impact, for each program cost, schedule, 
and performance objective, the value 1 represents minimum or no impact, while value 5 
represents severe impact as shown in Table 4. For each risk ask questions such as, does 
the risk impact the cost, schedule, or technical performance? Furthermore, does it impact 
operational or management performance? In terms of impact on cost, does it affect the 
acquisition or sustainment costs, or perhaps overall life-cycle costs? When it comes to 
impact on schedule, does the risk change the critical path of the program, meaning does it 
delay the program? It is important to note although each particular program will have its 
criteria for assigning an estimated likelihood and consequence, it should be systematic 
and less subjective (Rendon & Snider, 2008).  
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Table 4.   Table 4 Risk Consequence Values. Adapted from Rendon and Snider 
(2008). 
Value/Level Technical Performance Schedule Cost 
1 Minimal or no impact Minimal or no impact Minimal or no impact 
2 Minor reduction in technical 
for supportability, can be 
tolerated with little or no 
impact on program  
Able to meet key 
dates; Slip <=month(s) 
Budget increase or unit 
production  
cost increase; <= (1% of the 
budget) 
3 Moderate reduction in 
technical performance or 
supportability with little or no 
impact on program objectives 
Minor schedule slip; 
able to meet key 
milestones with no 
schedule float; Slip 
<=months(s); sub-
system slip>=months 
plus available float 
Budget increase or unit 
production  
cost increase; <=(5% of the 
budget) 
4 Significant degradation in 
technical performance or 
major shortfall in 
supportability might 
jeopardize program success. 
Program critical path 
affected; Slip <= 
months 
Budget increase or unit 
production  
cost increase; <=(10% of 
budget) 
5 Severe degradation in 
technical performance; cannot 
meet KPP or key technical/
supportability threshold; will 
jeopardize program success 
Cannot meet key 
program milestone; 
Slip >=months 
Exceeds APB thresholds;  
>=(10% of the budget) 
 
Following obtaining values for risk event likelihood and consequence, they are 
plotted on a 5x5 risk matrix shown in Figure 6. High-risk events (green area) will be 
located toward the top-right area, medium risk events will be located around the center 
(yellow area), while low risk events will be located toward bottom left area (green area), 
of the risk matrix. Each risk plotted on the matrix can be further be labelled according to 
its Risk Title (for example as in the risk WBS), Risk Casual Factor, and the Mitigation 
Approach which is the subject of the next phase (U.S. Department of Defense, 2006).  
Quantitative risk analysis involves the use of modelling and simulation method to 
quantify program’s level of identified risk events. Quantitative risk analysis techniques 
include monte Carlo technique, sensitivity analysis, value analysis, decision tree analysis 
etc. (Rendon & Snider, 2008).  
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4. Risk Response Planning 
Risk response planning is an activity of developing options, and determining the 
specific approach to address the identified risks.  
 
Figure 6.  Risk Matrix. Source: U.S. Department of Defense (2006). 
The specific approaches to address the risks as defined by U.S. DOD risk 
management guide include risk assumption, risk avoidance, risk mitigation, and risk 
transfer (U.S. Department of Defense, 2006). 
 Risk assumption—Risk assumption involves intentionally accepting the 
risk without changing the program scope; cost, schedule or technical 
performance objectives. Usually, this option is selected when the risk 
consequence is not major. Furthermore, this approach can be coupled with 
the provision and approval of contingency reserve of resources such as 
additional funds, or extending target dates etc., to handle the risk being 
accepted (United States Government Accountability Office, 2012). 
 Risk—avoidance Risk avoidance involves changing of the program scope; 
cost, schedule, and performance objectives. Usually, this option is selected 
when the risk consequence is so high to the extent that it is detrimental to 
the achievement of program’s objectives. Risk avoidance techniques 
include changing of program concept, technical designs specifications, 
manufacturing process, and contracting processes (Ketzer, 2006) and 
(Rendon & Snider, 2008).  
 Risk Mitigation—Risk mitigation involves developing strategies to reduce 
the risk likelihood of occurring, or the level of consequence. Risk 
mitigation does not focus on removing the root cause of the risk, instead 
on reducing the level of risk. Risk mitigation techniques include using 
prototypes, modelling and simulation, using configuration control boards, 
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extended tests in order to generate more technical information and better 
understand the program (Rendon & Snider, 2008). 
 Risk transfer—Risk transfer techniques include the use of contract-type 
strategies such as cost-reimbursement and fixed-type contracts. In a cost-
reimbursement contract, all the “allowable, allocable, and reasonable 
costs” are reimbursed by the DOD to the contractor, the cost risk are 
transferred from the contractor to the DOD (Rendon & Snider, 2008). In a 
fixed-price contract, the DOD only pays for fixed or adjusted price. 
Contract-type selection is the significant risk management strategy and 
requires technique. Figure 2 illustrates such a strategy (Rendon & Snider, 
2008). The contract-type selection strategy has not been analyzed in the 
SA DOD acquisition environment as a technique to reduce the risk 
(Armscor Practice for Selection of Contractual Sources, 2014). The 
contracting officer’s role in the SA DOD acquisition programs is 
performed by the program manager (Armscor Practice for Selection of 
Contractual Sources, 2014), as opposed to the U.S. were this role is 
performed by the contracting officer (Garrett & Rendon, 2007). For 
example GAO found that the use of cost-reimbursement contracts by the 
U.S. DOD to acquire early production of F35 Joint Strike Fighter 
transferred significant risk to the DOD. This is because the technical 
designs were not mature, likelihood to be changed, which ultimately delay 
the production and increase costs (United States Government 
Accountability Office, 2006).  
5. Risk Monitoring and Control 
Risk monitoring and control activity where the identified risk, and implemented 
risk management approach or technique, is monitored for their effectiveness and impact 
on the performance. If the implemented techniques were found to be ineffective, 
alternatives techniques are may be considered and applied. Otherwise, if the techniques 
are effective, the risk event can be reassessed, and reallocated a lower risk level. Risk 
monitoring and control further involves identifying new risks, performing risk analysis 
and response planning. It is exactly the same as repeating the risk management process, 
as it was mentioned that risk management is iterative, and applied throughout the 
program life cycle. The example of techniques used for risk monitoring and control are 
earned-value management, trend analysis, technical performance measures etc. (Rendon 
& Snider, 2008).  
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B. CONTRACT MANAGEMENT 
Contract management is a central element to defense acquisition activities. 
Contract management function is required and necessary for almost all phases of the 
acquisition processes. For many DOD’s organizations, the acquisition of systems, 
product and services, is governed from the higher structures of the government through 
procurement regulations that are applied commonly through all government departments 
and agencies. These regulations formulate the contract management principles and 
processes that endeavor to achieve the best value, manage risk, and facilitate fairness for 
the procurement, and consequently the acquisition system.  
Both U.S. government and SA government have the regulatory framework for 
contract management. The U.S. government has Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), 
as a governing and guiding regulation for government procurement, and applied across 
government executive agencies (Federal Acquisition Regulation, 2005). Similarly SA 
government has the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act (PPPFA), which 
governs the way in which government departments and agencies like SA DOD establish 
regulations for procurement during acquisitions (Preferential Procurement Regulations, 
2001 Pertaining to the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework act: no 5 of 2000, 
2000). The financial management system that supports the PPPFA and agency specific 
regulations is called Public Financial Management Act (PFMA) (Public Finance 
Management Act No. 1 of 1999, 1999). Defense acquisition policy documents such as 
DAP 1000, and contract management practice document such as A-PRAC-1034, and 
supplement PPPFA, are created and applied within the framework of PPPFA and PFMA 
(SA Department of Defence, 2010) and (Armscor Practice for Selection of Contractual 
Sources, 2014).  
The contract-type strategy is part of FAR; it is used widely across the U.S. DOD 
as a mechanism to address the procurement risks associated with various circumstances 
arising during the acquisition. Section 16 of FAR, commonly referred to as FAR part 16 
covers contract-type options available for the U.S. government executive agencies. The 
contract-type is selected by the contracting officer, and approved by the relevant body, 
and it is included in the AP by the IPT. The following subsection describes contract-types 
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as per FAR part 16 and factors affecting their selection. Thereafter, the chapter delves 
into the applicability of the contract-type to the acquisition process and risk management.  
1. Contract Types 
There are two broad categories of contract types namely, Fixed and Cost 
reimbursement type contract. The two categories are further divided into more 
specifically defined contract-types. Cost reimbursement consists of CPFF, CPIF and 
CPAF. Fixed-price contract consists of FFP, FPI, FPEA and fixed-price award fee 
(FPAF). For example in the CPFF, the DOD assumes most risks, and covers a significant 
part of the resulting costs and negotiated fixed fee (Profit). In the FFP, the contractor 
assumes most risks in terms of the resulting costs and profit (or loss). In between, a 
couple of incentive contracts in which the cost performance and profit are determined by 
the uncertainties affecting the contract performance (FAR, 2005) and (Butler & Land, 
2005).  
a. Fixed-Price Contracts 
Fixed-price contract-type are contracts providing for a firm price, or adjustable 
prices based on the ceiling price or target price (or both). There are three types of fixed-
price namely: FFP, FP/EPA, and FPI contracts. FFP and FP/EPA are used when 
Commercially-off-the-Shelf items are acquired, and cannot be used when in the 
acquisition of time-and-materials, and labor-hour contracts (FAR, 2005). 
(1) Firm Fixed-Price Contract 
A FFP contract is the contract which is characterized by the fact that price cannot 
be adjusted on the basis of contractor’s performance costs. This makes it simpler to place 
a charge upon the contractor to control costs. (FAR, 2005). According to U.S. FAR 
(2005) FFP can be used with incentive or award fee contracts, as long as incentives or 
award fee are not based on costs. 
FFP contracts are suitable in situations where the functional and technical 
specifications of the system or product being acquired are reasonably definite. An 
example would be in the situation where the IPT has determined that the technology 
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elements core to the system have matured enough, and there are no further risks 
associated with development (FAR, 2005).  
(2) Fixed-Price contract with Economic Price Adjustment  
The FAR describe the FPEA contract as the contract that “provides for upward 
and downward revision of the stated contract price upon the occurrence of specified 
contingencies” (FAR, 2005, p. 16.2-1). The FAR further states that the factors in which 
the price adjustments can be based on include adjustment based on the increase or 
decrease of the agreed upon published prices of specific item or specific contract end 
items, and end item cost of items such as labor, material and from associated indexes 
(FAR, 2005). These factors can arise due to, for example, instability of the markets or 
labor conditions that extends for a reasonable period during the performance of the 
contract or program phase. Likewise, FPEA contract can be used with incentive or award 
fee contract, as long as incentives or award fee are not based on cost. FPEA contracts are 
suitable in situation where the U.S. DOD determines that the contractor and the DOD 
needs should be protected against the specified contingencies (FAR, 2005).  
(3) Fixed-Price Incentive Contract 
A FPI contract is a contract whereby a final profit due to the contractor can be 
adjusted using a specified formula. According to FAR (2005, p. 16.2-3) definition a FPI 
contract is a “fixed-price contract that provides for adjusting profit and establishing the 
final contract price by a formula based on the relationship of final negotiated total cost to 
total target cost.” FAR however mention that the final price is limited by the specified 
ceiling agreed upon by the parties when the contract is initiated (FAR, 2005). FPI is 
further divided into two forms, firm target, and successive target (FAR, 2005).  
In a FPI firm target contract, a final profit due to the contractor is determined 
using an adjusting formula agreed upon by the two parties at the beginning of the contract 
(FAR, 2005). When the contractor completes performance, the final profit is established 
using this formula. The amount of profit depends is determined by weather the final cost 
is greater, or less than the target cost (FAR, 2005). This formula will result in a loss for a 
contractor if the final costs exceed the specified ceiling (FAR, 2005). Therefore, the 
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ceiling protects the government, while the profit variation incentive the contractor. (FAR, 
2005).  
FPI successive targets contract provides for the parties to revisit the contract after 
the performance has begun because there inadequate pricing data in the beginning (FAR, 
2005). These parties then determine if FFP or FPEA should be selected after a certain 
amount of contract performance has occurred using an incurred cost as a guide. (FAR, 
2005). 
(4) Fixed-Price Incentive contract with award fees 
The Fixed-Price Incentive contract with award fees is defined by FAR as  
Fixed-price contracts when the Government wishes to motivate a 
contractor and other incentives cannot be used because contractor 
performance cannot be measured objectively. Such contracts shall 
establish a fixed price (including normal profit) for the effort. This price 
will be paid for satisfactory contract performance. Award fee earned (if 
any) will be paid in addition to that fixed price. (FAR, 2005, p. 16.4-4 to 
16.4-5) 
b. Cost-Reimbursement Contracts 
In a cost-reimbursement contract the government permits to contractor to 
perform, then at the later stage pays the allowable incurred costs, plus an agreed upon fee 
at the beginning as a profit (FAR, 2005). The price determined at the beginning of the 
contract performance is only based on the estimates of fair and reasonable costs, in order 
to obligate the funds and establish the ceiling amount. Cost-reimbursement contracts are 
in general used in situations where, the circumstances do not allow for the determination 
of the definite requirement with certainty, and when the costs cannot be estimated with 
accuracy so the exact price can be established. These factors have to be established first, 
and AP be approved, prior to the issuing of the cost-reimbursement contract (FAR, 2005).  
There are additional requirement applicable to the IPT with regard to issuing of 
cost-reimbursement contracts, established to protect the government against possible 
unallowable costs. These requirements include, that the contractor accounting system 
should be adequate to determine the costs incurred during the performance of contract, 
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sufficient government resources should be available to provide contract oversight. It is 
typically not advisable to select cost-reimbursement contracts during the acquisition of 
COTS (FAR, 2005). Cost-reimbursement contracts are divided into various types, 
defined and applicable for differing situations. Each type is described as follows. 
(1) Cost Contract 
Cost contract is described by FAR (2005, p. 16.3-1) as “a cost-reimbursement 
contract in which the contractor receives no fee.” An application include “research and 
development work, particularly with nonprofit educational institutions or other nonprofit 
organizations” (2005, p. 16.3-1). 
(2) Cost Sharing Contract 
Cost sharing contract is described by FAR as  
a cost-reimbursement contract in which the contractor receives no fee and 
is reimbursed only for an agreed-upon portion of its allowable costs. An 
application includes a situation when “the contractor agrees to absorb a 
portion of the costs, in the expectation of substantial compensating 
benefits” (FAR, 2005, p. 16.3-1)  
(3) Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee Contract 
A CPFF contract is described by FAR as  
a cost-reimbursement contract that provides for payment to the contractor 
of a negotiated fee that is fixed at the inception of the contract. The fixed 
fee does not vary with actual cost, but may be adjusted as a result of 
changes in the work to be performed under the contract. This contract type 
permits contracting for efforts that might otherwise present too great a risk 
to contractors, but it provides the contractor only a minimum incentive to 
control costs. (FAR, 2005, p. 16.3-1) 
(4) Cost-Plus- Incentive-Fee Contract  
A CPIF contract is described by FAR as  
The cost-plus-incentive-fee contract is a cost-reimbursement contract that 
provides for the initially negotiated fee to be adjusted later by a formula 
based on the relationship of total allowable costs to total target costs. This 
contract type specifies a target cost, a target fee, minimum and maximum 
fees, and a fee adjustment formula. After contract performance, the fee 
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payable to the contractor is determined in accordance with the formula. 
The formula provides, within limits, for increases in fee above target fee 
when total allowable costs are less than target costs, and decreases in fee 
below target fee when total allowable costs exceed target costs. This 
increase or decrease is intended to provide an incentive for the contractor 
to manage the contract effectively. When total allowable cost is greater 
than or less than the range of costs within which the fee-adjustment 
formula operates, the contractor is paid total allowable costs, plus the 
minimum or maximum fee” (FAR, 2005, p. 16.4-5)  
 
CPIF contracts are used in major systems development contracts where technical 
performance incentives are appropriate, and the requirement and performance objectives 
can at least be described in general terms. The contract is mostly used in development 
and test contracts (FAR, 2005).  
(5) Cost-Plus- Award-Fee Contract  
CPAF contract is described by FAR as  
a cost-reimbursement contract that provides for a fee consisting of a base 
amount fixed at inception of the contract, if applicable and at the 
discretion of the contracting officer, and an award amount that the 
contractor may earn in whole or in part during performance and that is 
sufficient to provide motivation for excellence in the areas of cost, 
schedule, and technical performance. (FAR, 2005, p. 16.4-5)  
2. Factors Affecting the Selection of Contract Type 
The selection of the appropriate contract-type in contracting occurs as early as in 
the procurement planning phase, of the six phases of the procurement process (Garrett, 
2010). The following factors affect the selection of contract type at any phase of the 
acquisition as per FAR 16.104, and should be considered by the acquisition officials 
when selecting the contract-type. They are based upon an extent to which the risk 
reduction is required: 
 Price competition—adequate price competition allows for the 
determination of the realistic price, and it is relied upon when fixed-price 
type contracts are necessary (FAR, 2005). 
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 Total price analysis—price analysis provides the basis for contract type 
selection when adequate price competition cannot be attained. (FAR, 
2005).  
 Item costs analysis—It is used “in the absence of price competition, and 
price analysis,” and the contract-type that places a reasonable risk burden 
on contractor is negotiated (FAR, 2005). 
 Type and complexity of the requirement—Complex and broad 
requirements, government unique requirements, and complex research & 
development contracts with great level of uncertainty of the solution 
places a greater risk burden to the government, and cost-reimbursement 
contracts are preferable during these types of requirement. (FAR, 2005).  
 Combining contract-types—If the whole contract cannot be made FFP due 
to some circumstances, the acquisition officials should see if a certain 
portion of the contract cannot be made FFP (FAR, 2005). 
 Urgency of the requirement—If the system being acquired is primary, the 
government may assume a risk, and offer an incentive-based contracts in 
order to motivate the contractor (FAR, 2005).  
 Period of performance or length of the production run—Contracts 
extending over a long proposed period, and consumed significant amount 
of allocated funds may require an economic-price-adjustment-based 
contract (FAR, 2005). 
 Contractor’s responsibility—When the technical capability and financial 
responsibility of the contractor is uncertain, cost price contract may be 
selected in order to allow for the provision of oversight by the government 
(FAR, 2005). 
 Adequacy of the contractor accounting system—For contract-type 
contracts other than fixed-price, the government acquisition officials 
should ensure that the contractor accounting system is adequate to capture 
the costs data necessary for the selected contract-type (FAR, 2005).  
 Concurrent contracts—If the performance of the current contract is based 
on the concurrent operation of the other contracts, the status of the 
contract already in operation may affect the selection of the current 
contract-type (FAR, 2005). 
 Extent and nature of subcontracting—In the case where the contractor uses 
extensive subcontracting, the total contract risk should include the actual 
risk to the prime contractor, and the selection of contract-type should 
reflect this situation (FAR, 2005).  
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 Acquisition history—Overall risks decrease as the system is repetitively 
acquired, and the description and requirement can be defined more clearly. 
A fixed-price contract becomes more appropriate (FAR, 2005).  
3. Contract Management in the SA DOD 
According to A-PRAC-1034, when selecting the contractor during the 
procurement within the SA DOD, the IPT should strive to achieve objectives listed in the 
following text. These objectives further influence the flexibility of the SA DOD to 
implement the contract-type based risk mitigation strategy.  
 Competition—Competition should be encouraged as far as practical, even 
if it means foreign contractors need to be considered (Armscor Practice for 
Selection of Contractual Sources, 2014). This means in principle that 
fixed-price contracts such as FFP, FPEA, or FPI can be selected for award. 
However, there is no given guidance on what parameters to consider when 
using FPI. This include parameters that are important to determine the 
final price of the FPI such target costs, ceiling price, and the relationship 
between them (FAR, 2005). Furthermore, the PPPFA does not mention 
any incentive based contracts (Preferential Procurement Regulations, 2001 
Pertaining to the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework act: no 5 of 
2000, 2000).  
 Best value—The IPT should strive to award contracts based on best value, 
not necessarily on the lowest price. Best value may include among others, 
the total life cycle costs, and technology & industry mobilization goals 
(Armscor Practice for Selection of Contractual Sources, 2014) and 
(Defence in a Democracy, White Paper on National Defence for the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996). Qualitatively, the term best value, as 
used by A-PRAC-1034 is defined as performance, taking into account the 
risks.  
 Risks—The IPT should acknowledge that there exists a significant amount 
of uncertainty regarding the final cost of the contract items and schedule. 
This means that the SA DOD does consider assuming a fair amount risk 
during the acquisition, including cost risk. 
 Contract-type—There is further no formalized guidance on how to 
implement cost reimbursement contracts. There incentive and award fee 
based contracts are not possible according to the application of A-PRAC-
1034, and PPPFA frameworks. This range of contract-type selection does 
not motivate contractors to contain costs, while achieving schedule and 
technical performance. This should be an ultimate view of best value as 
required by the SA DOD (Armscor Practice for Selection of Contractual 
Sources, 2014 and Preferential Procurement Regulations, 2001 Pertaining 
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to the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework act: no 5 of 2000, 
2000).  
 Oversight—Oversight is important and should be provided, as per PPPFA 
because defense acquisition programs cost government billions of dollars. 
Nevertheless, it is expected that there should be transparency and 
accountability even as when oversight is applied, as directed by the 
PPPFA. This even if it means the issue is elevated to the legal subject, 
especially if contract irregularities and corruption is involved 
(Government of the Republic of South Africa General Procurement 
Guidelines, n.d.) and (Government of the Republic of South Africa Policy 
Strategy to Guide Uniformity in Procurement Reform Processes in 
Government, 2003). However, should be noted that transparency, 
accountability and responsibility is influenced by the historical, cultural 
and moral background of the society. In a society where transparency and 
accountability are achievable, the level of confidence to procurement 
regulations such as PPPFA improves (The AEY Investigation, 2008) and 
(Inspector General Department of Defense, Defense Criminal 
Investigative Service Las Vegas Post of Duty c/o USAF OSI, 2008).  
 Budget—The provision of incentive based contract-type is further 
influence by nation’s defense budget. The higher the funds allocated for a 
program, the easier it becomes for the SA DOD to assume the risk and 
award incentives contract in order to improve performance. Therefore, 
under stringent budget conditions and strict schedule requirement it would 
be challenging to obligate funds for incentive fees. Primarily, these 
relationships are fundamentally influenced by the nation’s priorities with 
respect to defense. For example, according to SA defense review (SA 
Department of Defence, 2014), the current spend on defense is less than 
1.2% of nation’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Therefore, the solution 
lies at the national policy level.  
C. DEFENSE ACQUISITION FRAMEWORKS AND CONTRACT-TYPE 
The U.S. DOD acquisition system consists of a process, with a series of phases 
and milestones. Phases represent the life cycle stages in which an acquired system goes 
through. Milestones represent the decision making points to provide for formal transition 
from one phase to another. This section summarizes broad objectives and activities of 
each phase of the U.S. DOD acquisition framework, and thereafter typical contract-types 
selected per each phase. The section then introduces the SA DOD acquisition process.  
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1. U.S. DOD Acquisition Framework 
Figure 7 shows the U.S. DOD acquisition framework (Acquisition Process:  
Acquisition Process Overview, n.d.), typically used for Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs (MDAPs). The U.S. DOD Directive 5000.1 allows the process to be tailored to 
program specific requirements. For example, an IPT can be establish during the Materiel 
Solution Analysis (MSA) phase that there is already sufficient technology maturation for 
the desired product, and obtain approval to move directly from MSA to EMD phase. It is 
mandatory that Request for Proposal (RFP) released before a particular phase is entered 
is based on competitive contracting. This means that the contractor performing one 
particular phase will not necessarily be awarded a contract for the next phase. In this 
regard, it is imperative that the IPT implements an Intellectual Property (IP) and data 
management strategy (U.S. Department of Defense, 2003). 
The process begins after the Materiel Decision Development (MDD) point, 
directed by the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA). At this point, part of decision 
made by the MDA, is to determine the acquisition entry phase. The decision is based on 
the validated Initial Capability Document (ICD), approval of the Analysis of Alternatives 
(AoA) study guidance, and AoA study plan. If the MDA decision directs that further 
analysis is needed on the desired product, the acquisition entry point would be the 
Materiel Solution Analysis (MSA) (U.S. Department of Defense, 2015). 
 
 
Figure 7.  U.S. DOD Acquisition Framework. Source: Acquisition Process: 
Acquisition Process Overview (n.d.). 
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a. Materiel Solution Analysis Phase and Milestone A 
The MSA phase involves the process translating capability gaps into system-
specific requirements. This include conducting necessary analysis to develop concept of 
the required product, Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) and Key System Attributes 
(KSAs), gathering initial information to support acquisition strategy (U.S. Department of 
Defense, 2015). Key activities, as stated by U.S. Department of Defense (2015) include 
AoA, performing trade-off among cost, schedule and technical performance, affordability 
analysis, and risk management planning. The MSA phase is terminated after an approval 
is obtained from the MDA at Milestone A, to move to the next phase, the TMRR and 
release the RFP for the TMRR activities (U.S. Department of Defense, 2015). 
b. Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction Phase and Milestone B 
The TMRR phase as defined by U.S. Department of Defense (2015, p. 19) 
involves the process of “reducing technology, engineering, and integration & life cycle 
cost risks.” This is achieved through preliminary system requirement and design 
tradeoffs. This phase may further include building of prototypes as long as they are 
primarily intended for technology maturation and risk reduction before the development 
of the system. Product Design Review is conducted during the TMRR phase prior to 
Milestone B. The TMRR phase is terminated after an approval of Capability 
Development Document is obtained at Milestone B, an authorization to enter to the next 
phase, the EMD, and release the RFP for the EMD activities. The Acquisition strategy is 
approved at Milestone B. The decision at Milestone B also confirms the investment of 
significant resources to the program, and therefore the requirement process should have 
been satisfactorily fulfilled before RFP release point (U.S. Department of Defense, 2015).  
c. Engineering and Manufacturing Development Phase and Milestone C 
The Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase consists of the 
complete development, build and test process of a product that satisfy the capability 
requirements. It includes detail engineering design activities such as the design and 
implementation of hardware and software prototypes, Critical Design Reviews (CDR), 
Production Readiness Review (PRR) to determine if Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) 
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and Full Rate Production (FRP) are feasible, Developmental Test and Evaluation 
(DT&E), early Operation Test and Evaluation (OT&E), validation of that the designed 
system meets the capability requirements etc. The acquisition strategy is reviewed and 
updated prior to the release of RFP for the next phase. The EMD phase terminates after 
an approval of Capability Production Document at Milestone C (Department of Defense, 
2015).  
d. Production and Deployment Phase 
The Production and Deployment (P&D) phase entails the production and delivery 
of the products to the operational organizations. The activities at P&D phase include: 
LRIP, limited deployment of the system, OT&E, FRP, Full deployment decisions, 
product support and sustainment (LCSP) decisions etc. This phase leads to full 
operational capability (U.S. Department of Defense, 2015).  
e. Operations and Support Phase 
The Operations and Support (O&S) phase entails the preparation, approval, and 
implementation of the Life Cycle Sustainment Plan (LCSP). This phase includes the 
delivery and deployment of the product support packages such as, IP and data right 
documents, training considerations activities, necessary facilities to perform maintenance 
at all depot levels, acquisition of operations, and maintenance tools and equipment which 
should be included in the LCSP (U.S. Department of Defense, 2015).  
2. Typical Contract Type and Risk Management by Acquisition Phase  
As mentioned, the objective of using the contract-type is to balance risks between 
the government and a contractor. Although there is no universal technique to use on 
deciding what contract-type to select at a particular acquisition phase, the technological 
risks decreases as the acquisition program life cycle progresses from early phases to later 
phases of the acquisition. Figure 8 shows a typical situation contract type by acquisition, 
taking risks into consideration (Griffin, 2011). Generally it is in the government 
preference to utilize the fixed-price contracts, however this is not possible when the 
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requirement and system specification is still broadly defined, and the technology is still 
immature (FAR, 2005).  
 
 
Figure 8.  Typical Contract Type and Risk Management by Acquisition phase. 
Source: Griffin (2011). 
During the phases when the requirement is still broad, contract costs and 
schedules are uncertain, risks are high, and therefore potential contractors are usually 
pessimistic on taking risks by accepting the fixed type contract. This results in the 
situation where the government has to share the cost risks by negotiating for a contract 
type that will be more reasonable for a contractor to take risks, and provide incentive for 
achieving performance. Therefore, cost reimbursement-based contract-types are 
reasonable during the early phases of the acquisition. This typically corresponds to the 
MSA and TMRR phases of the acquisition process.  
As the acquisition efforts move from Milestone B to EMD, the requirements and 
system specifications become more clearly defined, hence the major investment decision 
on a program by the MDA. However, the detail hardware and software performance, 
DT&E, OT&E are still uncertain as building and testing of prototypes is yet to 
materialize. During these phases of the acquisition process, hybrid of cost reimbursement, 
incentive, and fixed contract-type are appropriate. Costs containment, schedule, and 
technical performance are usually incentivized. This also corresponds to P&D phase. 
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An acquisition that occurs during the O&S phase usually entails the procurement 
of products already having a well-defined requirement and reduced risk from the previous 
phases of the acquisition process. In some situation, this phase is characterized by the 
transition to the low risk commercial supplies of products, as the catered for provision in 
the LCSP (U.S. Department of Defense, 2015). During this phase, competitive 
contracting is possible and FFP contract are appropriate (FAR, 2005).  
3. South African Department of Defence Acquisition Process 
The SA DOD acquisition process is shown in Figure 9 (SA Department of 
Defence, 2010). Similar to the U.S. DOD acquisition framework, in general, there are key 
notable elements that relate to the goal of this research. They are: the major phase 
description corresponding to the system life cycle stages, decision milestones, system 
engineering technical reviews, and major RFP release points. Minor differences are noted 
and summarized. 
a. Milestone 0 
Milestone 0 entails the approval of the Required Operational Capability (ROC) 
document by the SA DOD milestone decision authority. The ROC documents the 
requirement specification, as guided by the operational shortcomings due to capability 
gaps, force design structure etc. ROC prepared by the end-user at the level of DOD 
services after possibly a series of User Requirement Reviews (URR), approved by the 
Operational Staff Council (OSC) at the Joint Operational Level. The approval of the ROC 




Figure 9.  South African DOD Acquisition Process. Source: SA Department of 
Defence (2010). 
b. Concept Phase and Milestone 1 
The aim of the concept phase is to perform a functional analysis, to address the 
requirement specifications as contained in the RBL. This functional analysis is performed 
by the use of Exploratory Development Models (XDM) to explore different solution 
concepts. This includes but is not limited to systems engineering architectures, simulation 
and experimentations, development board’s prototyping, etc. The concept phase is 
terminated when the FBL is established after possible series of System Requirement 
Reviews (SRR) and System Design Reviews (SDR) at Milestone 1. This involves the 
approval of the Functional User Requirement Statement (FURS) and Logistic User 
Requirement Statement (LURS) document.  
 37 
c. Definition Phase and Milestone 2 
The aim of the definition phase is to develop a well-defined system specification, 
primarily at the level of the operational requirement. This includes technical requirements 
expressed as a system “A” specifications together with the number of development “B” 
specifications for selected Configuration Items. The goals are achieved through building 
and testing Advanced Development Models (ADM). The definition phase is terminated 
after possibly a series of Preliminary Design Reviews (PDR) and the Allocated Baseline 
(ABL) is established, at Milestone 2. The AP, which includes important elements such as 
the make or buys decisions, is the product of the definition phase. The decision at 
Milestone 2 confirms the government investment intent on the program by acquiring the 
required capability. Formal acquisition, which includes developmental RFP release, 
begins after the approval of Milestone 2. 
d. Design Development Phase and Milestone 2a 
The aim of the Design Development (D&D) phase is to further define and 
develop the selected product system by development of workable production 
specification (product, material, and manufacturing specifications). The phase involves 
detailed developmental activities by which the Engineering Development Models (EDM) 
including hardware and software are produced, integrated to a form product, integration 
issues are addressed, and performing DT&E. Series of CDRs are conducted, to address 
low level design and implementation decision. The D&D phase is terminated when 
Product Baseline (PBL) is established at Milestone 2a. 
e. Industrialization Phase and Milestone 3 
The purpose of the Industrialization phase is to develop and qualify 
manufacturing specifications and processes that can be used to task the industry to 
manufacture the product in accordance to the specific SA DOD requirement. This 
includes design of production lines, process control, quality control etc. The concepts of 
Industrialization phase are tested through the production of Pre-production Models 
(PPMs), and performing Initial OT&E (IOT&E). In some cases, this phase becomes part 
of the DD phase. In situations where there is no DOD specific production processes 
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requirement, the flexibility is provided to combine this phase with D&D phase. The 
Industrialization phase is terminated when the Manufacturing Baseline (MBL) is 
established at Milestone 3.  
f. Production Phase and Milestone 3a 
The Production phase involves the process whereby the product system is 
manufactured in accordance with the stated user requirement specification, system 
requirement specification, product specification, and any other defined low level 
specifications developed during prior phases. The aim of the production phase is to qualify 
a system that can be accepted by the SA DOD at the combat capability level. Production 
Models and OT&E are used to test the compliance to specifications. The production phase 
is terminated when the Initial Operational Baseline (OBL) is established after possibly a 
series of Formal Qualification Reviews (FQR) at Milestone 3a.  
g. Commissioning Phase and Milestone 3a 
The purpose of the commissioning phase is to determine the manner in which the 
SA DOD service groups operationally employ the system in coordination with the supply 
baselines, combat grouping etc. Furthermore, the aspects of functional performance, 
safety, supportability requirements, logistic, documentation, training and interim support 
contracts are finalized. The commissioning phase terminates with the establishment of the 
OBL at Milestone 4, and handing over of the system by the IPT to services (Level 6 SA 
DOD component).  
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY  
This chapter presented various risk management processes available in literature, 
which can be applied by the IPTs when conducting risk management. Contract 
management principles, are applicable to both SA and U.S. DOD acquisition programs, 
and are commonly applied across all government departments and agencies. Contract-
type provisions, as covered in the FAR, are used to balance risks between the government 
and the contractor in the U.S. DOD acquisition system, across the acquisition framework. 
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Achieving the best-value and competition is encouraged in the SA DOD 
acquisitions to improve overall performance, however A-PRA-1034 and PPPFA does not 
provide guidance on how to incentivize stakeholders using contract-types for achieving 
these objectives. Incentive-based and cost-reimbursement contracts are not explored.  
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III. HYPOTHESIS 
This research plans to address research questions by using the SA DOD 
acquisition process presented in Chapter II, and the hypothesis presented and described in 
this chapter. The research intends to investigate the possibilities of using the standard 
contract-type strategy aligned to different phases of the SA DOD acquisition process. As 
it was discussed in Chapter II, the contract-type strategy is neither a universal technique 
nor framework to select a contract-type for risk management purposes. However, to 
balance the risks between the government and contractor, some contract-type are more 
appropriate at certain stages of the acquisition than others.  
This chapter uses an approach presented on Figure 8 for the U.S. DOD acquisition 
process, to allocate contract-types for each phase of the SA DOD acquisition process of 
Figure 9. The basis of allocation is based on the relationship of extent to which the 
requirement is defined, and risks anticipated in the particular phase. Unlike in the usual 
case as per the provision of PPPFA and A-PRAC-1034, the application of incentive-
based and award fees contracts are considered for award. The proposed contract-type 
allocation per particular phase is shown in Figure 10.  
 
 
Figure 10.  South African DOD Acquisition Process with a Proposed Contract-
type Strategy.  
During the concept phase the contracts awards mostly involve the delivery of 
architecture designs, the system requirement is still broad. The CPIF contracts are 
recommended to incentivize the contractor for both performance and costs containment. 
During the definition phase, the efforts involve the development of system specification, 
the CPIF contract can be selected to incentivize costs, and CPAF contract can be used to 
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provide motivation for improved performance. The contracts in the D&D phase involve 
the delivery of multiple activities of engineering developmental prototypes and items that 
are different in complexity, including building and testing of combination of hardware 
and software subsystems. Hence the hybrid of contract-type as shown in Figure 10 can be 
selected.  
Any of the FPI contracts (firm, successive target, etc.) can be selected during the 
Industrialization phase to incentivize the contractor to contain the manufacturing costs of 
the development of PPM. The selection of an incentive contract implies that, although the 
solution is proven, innovation still needs to be incentivized to achieve cost effective 
manufacturing processes, and required schedule performance. However, once the 
manufacturing baseline is established for the Production phase the risks are reduced 
because the manufacturing specification has been created, hence the FFP contracts are 
appropriate during the Industrialization phase. Commissioning phase does not have any 
requirement uncertainty, because it occurs when the capability has been completely 
acquired. Mostly, it involves the supply of support equipment and services. Therefore, the 
risk is low, and FFP contracts are recommended.  
It is hypothesized that the proposed contracting strategy shown in Figure 10, 
when used with the risk management process from in Figure 1 or Figure 5 as risk 
mitigation technique can reduce the costs and schedule risk. Therefore, cost overruns and 





IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PAST AND CURRENT SA DOD 
ACQUISITION PROGRAMS 
In this chapter, the acquisition outcome of three past and current SA DOD 
acquisition programs are presented, for the purpose of examining the recommended 
contract-type strategy on risk management. The impact of the contract-type strategy on 
risk mitigation will be assessed by the analysis of similar U.S. DOD programs in the next 
chapter using risk management approaches described in Chapter III.  
A. PAST SA DOD ACQUISITION PROGRAMS 
The past acquisition program to be examined includes the program portfolio 
components of the SDP. The strategic objective of the SDP was to modernize the SA 
DOD defense equipment and retain effective defense capability, as per the 1998 
Parliamentary Defence Review (SA Department of Defence, 2008). The selected 
programs include the acquisition of Light Utility Helicopters (LUH), Gripen Advanced 
Light Fighter Aircraft (ALFA), and the Hawk Lead-In Fighter Trainer (LIFT).  
1. Light Utility Helicopter Program  
The acquisition of the LUH originated as the result of the capability need and a 
gap to upgrade the Alouette III SA DOD operational helicopter capability, which was 
about 30 years of old at the time. The objective of the LUH program was to develop a 
platform that will provide for a transport capability, combat support capability, and 
training capability. The concept phase began in 1992, and the milestone decision to 
continue with the definition phase was approved in 1996. During this year the Request 
for Information (RFI) was conducted by the project team, to establish the system 
requirement. No information was obtained on the contract-type used during these phases. 
However, the situation necessitated the award of cost reimbursement contract with CPFF 
as no incentive-based are on record for any SA procurement regulations. The Request for 
Offer (RFO) for development was issued to the three shortlisted contractors in 1998. The 
decision to shortlist contractors during the RFI was influenced by higher governmental 
structures, due to defense offsets requirement.  
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The offsets required that the contractors will be compensated based on the 
economic investment made in the country during the D&D through the commission 
phase. Furthermore, each contractor was required to produce a plan on how to achieve the 
offsets requirements. This necessitated that the contract be of cost reimbursement-type 
contract, and specifically CPAF. However, the Arms Procurement Commission Index to 
Statement Colonel F.K.S. Viljoen (2013) stated that the contract for the supply of LUH 
was fixed, at the price of $199,778,887 at 1999 currency exchange rate. The D&D phase 
started in the year 2000. The length of the D&D phase, subsequent phases continued as 
summarized in Table 5 (Botha, 2003; Re: Arms Procurement Commission Submissions 
(Rationale), 2013 and Brauer & Dunne 2004).  
Table 5 further summarizes other program outcomes associated with the LUH, 
such as costs. From Table 5, the costs summary, and the planned schedule for the early 
phases (Concept and Definition phases) of the LUH program are not shown as these 
phases include iterative activities, with the strong uncertainty of the solution definition 
(Defenceweb.com, 2010; A109 Costs Climb, 2011 and Re: Arms Procurement 
Commission Submissions (Rationale), 2013). 
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Table 5.   Summary of the LUH Acquisition Outcomes Parameters. Adapted from Defenceweb.com (2010); A109 
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a. Further Issues and Remarks on Light Utility Helicopter Program  
By 2007, only 11 of 30 expected aircraft were delivered as part of the LRIP, and 
termination of the Industrialization phase. The delay during the D&D and production 
phases extended an already four-year delay for the commissioning phase, which included 
critical cost elements such as training (SA Department of Defence, 2007cb. 
b. Proposed Contract Type strategy for Light Utility Helicopter Program  
An application of incentive fee contract-type at the concept phase or award fee 
contract-type at the definition phase would have reduced the risks associated with the 
design of the propulsion system. This is because different architectures of the propulsion 
system would have been simulated and experimented. A better solution would have been 
obtained by incentivizing the contractor in order to encourage a development of easy to 
implement propulsion system architecture. Significant schedule delays experienced 
between the D&D and commissioning phase would have also been reduced if the better 
and easy to implement architecture was developed during the concept and definition 
phase.  
An award of CPIF and FPI during the D&D phase could have been used to 
encourage the contractor to reduce the costs of some contract items, by incentivizing 
lower development cost (Griffin, 2011). CPFF and FPEA are appropriate for the contract 
items that cannot be incentivized. FPI would have been used during the Industrialization 
phase to encourage the contractor to develop cheaper to operate manufacturing 
capabilities, therefore technology and costs are incentivized. This would have reduced 
cost overruns experienced during production and commissioning phase. Therefore, by 
incentivizing costs the difference between the planned and actual costs would have the 
potentially been reduced. The FFP contract can be awarded at the production and 
commissioning phase as technology, cost and schedule risks are low. This is in line with 
the proposed contract strategy in Figure 10.  
Alternatively to the contracting strategy, EVM could have been used during the 
acquisition strategy (Prior to the D&D phase) to tie the technical performance, cost and 
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schedule. The significant difference between the planned and actual schedule shown in 
the in the Table 5 could have been managed. 
2. The Gripen Program and Its Contracting Strategy  
The concept of the Gripen program was conceived after the delivery of the 
upgraded Mirage III fighter aircraft in 1986. The SA DOD had embarked on a joint 
program with Israel Aircraft Industry to upgrade their fighter aircraft trainer Mirage III to 
operational cheetah fighter aircraft standard in order to keep up with the advances on the 
airpower domain. During that period, aircraft manufactures had already started 
developing fly-by-wire controlled engines, digital cockpits with integrated avionic, and 
sophisticated electronic warfare. The SA DOD exposure to this digital era aircraft 
enabled the grasp of the value provided by these platforms. This created a capability need 
for a modern, state-of-the-art multi-role combat capability. The primitive needs included 
capabilities such as air-to-air and air-to-ground combat capability, In-flight refueling, air-
combat training capability etc. The options to completely seal the capability gap using 
these modern systems were considered during the years 1994 to 1997. This represented 
the concept phase (Re: Arms Procurement Commission Submissions (Rationale), 2013).  
When the defense review of 1998 mandated the SA DOD to maintain the 
modernized defense equipment, the current operational LIFT, Mirage II aircraft and 
upgraded front-line fighter aircraft Cheetah was aging very quickly, with the maximum 
life expected of up-to 2003 and 2012 respectively. The need to replace these platforms 
with digital-era, multi-role Hawk LIFT for training pilots, and Gripen ALFA was made 
during 1996. The RFI was conducted from the preferred contractors during the year 1998 
and 1999. The contracts for the D&D and production phase of Hawk and Gripen were 
completed in three segments. The process would deliver 24 and 28 Hawks and Gripens in 
total respectively, per the Arms Procurement Commission (2013).  
Table 6 shows the summary of the acquisition outcome parameters for the Gripen 
aircraft throughout the acquisition process. The contract value for 28 Gripens was R9, 
952 million, fixed at 1999 exchange rates, excluding an escalation due to inflation. This 
means that when inflation changes, the price would change, a reasonable indication of 
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FPEA contract-type (Re: Arms Procurement Commission Submissions (Rationale), 
2013).
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Table 6.   Summary of the Gripen Acquisition Outcomes Parameters. Adapted from: Defenceweb.com (2010); Botha, 
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Furthermore, because part of the capability need for the acquisition of Gripen and 
Hawk was the ambition by the operational forces to transform to new technology and 
digital-era-based platforms, there was a financial requirement set by the higher 
government structures. The contract requirement had to balance affordability and 
technical requirement. The affordability study was conducted, included as part of the 
RFO, and was part of the criteria to offer selection. The department of finance provided 
an oversight to this requirement. The expected final delivery of Gripens was in 2011 
(Botha, 2003), (Sylvester & Seegers, 2009), and (Re: Arms Procurement Commission 
Submissions (Rationale), 2013, 2013).  
The first delivery of the Gripen aircraft occurred in 2007. This indicated the 
termination of the successful Industrialization phase, as the overall project was supposed 
to be finalized end of the year 2011. The project was well on schedule. However, most of 
schedule delays and cost overruns for the Gripen project were due to the unforeseen 
support activities and costs at the commissioning phase.  
The costs overruns experienced at the D&D could have been contained by 
awarding the CPIF and FPI with primary incentive based on cost containment. Therefore, 
it would not have been a necessity to select CPAF and FPEA at the commissioning phase 
in order to resolve the issues. FFP contract would have been selected, as most of the 
technological risks would have been reduced. The risks should have been shifted to the 
contractor at the commissioning phase. This is in line with the proposed contract strategy 
in Figure 10. Similar to the LUH program, an alternatively to the technique, EVM could 
have been used during the acquisition strategy (Prior to the D&D phase) to tie the 
technical performance, cost and schedule. The difference between the planned and actual 
costs, and planned and actual schedule shown in the in the Table 6 could have been 
managed. 
3. The Hawk Program 
The capability need for the acquisition of Hawk LIFT is identified in the previous 
sections. The primary capability gap was the aging of the current capability, which was 
due to retire in 2003. The capability need was to move toward digital-era LIFT capability, 
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as it was trending in most of the DODs around the world. Therefore, the initial accounts 
of the acquisition outcome during the first two phases of the Hawk program were similar 
to the Gripen program. The deviations occurred starting from the D&D phase. The data in 




Table 7.   Summary of the Hawk Acquisition Outcomes Parameters. Adapted from Hawk LIFT Support Costs 
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a. Further Issues and Remarks on Hawk Program  
The one year delay shown in Table 7 was due to the commissioning of the last 
elements of a capability to maintain some elements of the aircraft, such as the hydraulic 
system and the auxiliary power unit (Armscor Annual Report 2013/14, 2014).   
b. Proposed Contract Type Strategy for a Hawk Program  
The schedule delay of one year is reasonable considering the extent and nature of 
the technical work specified in the previous paragraph. The significant cost overruns due 
to unforeseen design authority support, and other elements indicates that the 
supportability risks where not addressed. The supportability risk was supposed to be 
addressed when the system architecture design tradeoffs and analysis were performed. 
These activities occur at the concept and definition phase (Defenceweb.com, 2011).  
Similar to the LUH program, a better solution would have been obtained by 
selecting CPIF during the concept and definition phase to encourage the contractor to 
develop innovative system architecture solution. Significant cost overruns experienced 
between D&D by awarding CPIF and FPI in order to incentive cost containment. Similar 
to the Gripen program, it would not have been a necessity to select CPAF and FPEA at 
the commissioning phase in order to resolve the issues. FFP contract would have been 
selected, as most of the system support risks would have been reduced. The risks should 
have been shifted to the contractor at the commissioning phase. Once again, this is in line 
with the proposed contract strategy in Figure 10.  
Furthermore, EVM could have been used during the acquisition strategy (Prior to 
the D&D phase) to tie the technical performance, cost and schedule. The significant 






B. SUMMARY OF THE ANALYSIS OF PAST SA DOD ACQUISITION 
PROGRAMS 
The analysis of three past SA DOD programs, and associated contracting 
strategies indicates that the use of incentive based and award fee contracts to encourage 
innovative solutions, containing costs, and schedule control is limited. The analysis 
shows that, most of the issues experienced downstream of the acquisition phases, were 
due to the risk not being identified upstream of the acquisition process. It would therefore 
be advantageous to the program performance to consider the selection of incentive-based 
and award fee contracts.  
However, as it was noted in Chapter II, this requires that the costs incurred by the 
incentive-based and award contracts be allowable in the regulation document PFMA. The 
PPPFA would widen its contract-type base, to include incentive-based and award 
contracts. This will eventually include the SA DOD specific contracting directive 
document, the A-PRAC-1034.  
It should be noted that there was insufficient data pertaining to the specific 
planned and actual cost, and schedule per phase from the D&D phase to commission 
phase. There was also no data pertaining to the cost and planned schedule for the concept 
and definition phase. The contracting strategy shown in Figure 10, which is incorporated 
to the risk management process, would have significantly, indirectly reduced the schedule 
delays and cost overruns. Therefore, this fact addresses the research question presented in 
Chapter I, should this strategy be implemented in order to avoid acquisition program risks 
that lead to cost overruns and schedule delays? Although not deliberated in detail, the 
EVM system was proposed for the acquisition strategy in order to manage deviations 
showed in Tables 5, 6 and 7.  
C. ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT SA DOD ACQUISITION PROGRAM 
The objective of this section is to hypothetically apply the contracting strategy 
shown in Figure 10 to a selected current SA DOD program, as the means of testing its 
effectiveness in risks management. The risk management process of Figure 5 is used. The 
contract-type is recommended for each particular phase of the acquisition process, as 
guided by the principles reviewed in Chapter II of this report; literature review. The 
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selected program is at the early phases of the acquisition program, hypothetically at the 
concept phase. Therefore, the risk management is performed from the perspective of the 
information gathered at the concept phase. The justification for the selection of particular 
contract-type is explained, and the outcomes are predicted.  
1. Introduction of the Current SA DOD Acquisition Programs 
The SA DOD embarked on revitalizing the operational air surveillance radar 
capabilities. The radar capability is categorized into air defense and air traffic radar 
systems. There are several types of radars systems that are addressed by the project study 
during the concept phase. These include Tactical Mobile Radar (TMR), Precision 
Approach Radar (PAR), and Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) (Project Chutney 
(Replacing South African Air Force Radars), n.d.). Depending on the outcome of the 
concept phase, the solution may involve the replacement or upgrade in order to fill the 
capability gap (Pearson & Rocca, 2000). Furthermore, the report assumes that an analysis 
that leads to the selection of materiel solution over other operationally-based alternatives 
has been performed.  
a. Capability Gap Analysis  
This capability gap analysis provides a formal approach to translate the user stated 
needs with user terminology, into effective needs usable in developing system technical 
specification and thereafter a system requirement (Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2011). 
Although operational analysis (CONOPS) is an important technique of achieving 
capability gap analysis, it will not be covered explicitly in this report due to the details it 
contains. 
b. Problem Statement 
The current radar systems used by SA DOD to provide surveillance service are 
aged, require constant maintenance, and are becoming economic liability. Furthermore, 
these systems are not compatible with the new communication systems, such as data 
links, that are required to share data together.  
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c. Capability Needs  
There is a need to replace the current radar systems used by the SA DOD, in order 
to continue to execute the mandate as provided by the constitution. There are at least 
three radar systems encompassed by the problem statement. The operational guidelines 
require that these systems should provide a primary and secondary radar coverage over a 
certain specified depth, height across the borders, and mobile radar coverage anywhere in 
sub-Saharan Africa. The acquisition of three new radar systems will enable the SA DOD 
to fill this capability gap (Pearson & Rocca, 2000). This very high-level stated capability 
need is referred to as primitive capability need (Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2011).  
d. Translating Primitive Capability Needs to Effective Capability Needs 
Figure 11 translates the capability needs into contextualized effective needs. The 
effective needs provide a revised problem statement and capability needs, obtained after a 
capability based assessment. Additionally, effective needs provide a system thinking 
approach and effort, in describing and filling the capability gaps. The process results in 
the need for the replacement of each radar systems as shown in Figure 11. For the 
purpose of this research, and due to the complexity of the specification and requirement 
for each radar, only one radar system will be analyzed, the SSR radar.  
 
Figure 11.  Translation of Primitive Radar Capability Needs Into Effective Radar 
Capability Needs. 
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2. RISK MANAGEMENT FOR THE ACQUISITION OF SECONDARY 
SURVEILLANCE RADAR  
The SSR capability in the SA DOD is used for the purpose of Air Traffic 
Management and Air Defense. In the current setup, some SSR are integrated with 
Primary Surveillance Radars, hence the AD function. The new system has to be 
incorporated with the new interrogating system modes, the Identification Friend or Foe 
(IFF) in order to be interoperable to current platforms (Pearson & Rocca, 2000). The risk 
management for the acquisition of the SSR program, formulated for the purpose of this 
report is performed as follow. 
a. Risk-Management Planning 
This activity involves making overall decisions on how to approach to approach 
risk management for a specific program. This will include for example, deciding on what 
processes, risk mitigation techniques etc., the IPT is going to implement for risk 
management purpose. Risk management planning defines the project scope and the WBS 
for the SSR acquisition program as follows.  
(1) Project Scope 
The replacement of SSR system shall be conducted in a one-for-one fashion due 
to the criticality of the function they perform. The time schedule to fill the capability gap 
limited and the requirement is urgent. Under current fiscal difficulties and resulting 
budgetary constraints, the SA DOD is looking to minimize the overall costs of the 
program. Table 8 provides the summarized scope of the program in terms of functions 
expected form the desired system and the program requirement. In Table 8, each function 
and requirement is mapped to the expected stakeholder, and the rationale for the 






Table 8.   Summary of the SSR Acquisition Program Scope. 
Functions/Requirement Main stakeholder Rationale for the need 
Air Traffic Control services within the 
designated area of operation in cooperation 
with all relevant national and international 
flight control agencies. The specific functions 
includes provision of Aerodrome and 
Approach control to regulate all air traffic 
within allocated airspace around airbase, 
flight information service, and Alerting 
services. 
 
Air Traffic Controller  Operator 
Air Defense services which includes 
territorial air defense, theatre air defense, area 
air defense, point defense. 
Mission Controller Operator 
Surveillance services which include provision 
of positional data of airborne objects at 
specified levels for the purpose of creating a 
rapid air picture for cooperative and non-
cooperative targets. 
Operational Commander  Client 
Low Mean-Time-Between-Failures and 
Mean Time to Repair, part and tool 
standardization, open architecture design. 
Maintenance and logistic 
support personnel  
Indirect user 
Low development (acquisition) and total 
ownership cost, minimum acquisition 
schedule, and long life time. 
Secretary of Defense/




(2) Program WBS 
Figure 12 shows the Program WBS of the SSR acquisition program. Three-level 
WBS is presented for the purpose of identifying and managing risk areas at the concept 
phase from the Program Management Office (PMO) point of view. This WBS is purely 
established for the purpose and use of testing concepts presented in this report; it does not 











Figure 12.  Program WBS for SSR Acquisition Program. 
b. Risk Identification  
The risk identification activity presented here for the SSR uses the Program WBS 
elements from Figure 11 which systematically determine which risk might affect the 
program. Most of the risks identified with an aid and guidance from the WBS are 
technical risks, as the WBS structure elements are technical in nature. However, the WBS 
can be expanded to include other critical elements of the program such as program 
systems engineering and program management requirement that are addressed at the 
PMO. Table 9 provides identified SSR risks. 
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Table 9.   Risk Identification Categorized by Facets for the SSR Acquisition Program.  
Risk No. Risks root cause Risk facet Impacted Life-cycle 
phase 
Radar system    
1.1 Antenna    
1. Antenna 
architecture 
SA DOD requires the selection of the Active Electronically Scanned 
Array (AESA). This is a new technology radar antenna architecture 
optimized for tracking and scanning. The technology is not matured yet.  




There is a limited research support on AESA within the SA. Technical and 
supportability 
Definition and D&D 
1.2 Transceiver     
1.2.1 Transceiver 
architecture 
A selection of AESA antenna locks the transceiver architecture selection 
to state-of-the-art new technology solid-state transceivers. This is 
because AESA antennas are only compatible to AESA solid-state 
transceivers. Solid-state transceivers are still new technology, and 






   
1.3.1 Processor  The research is currently underway to migrate radar processor to 
Software Defined Radar (SDR) technology, selecting a processor based 
on current technology might introduce obsolescence issues at the 





System T&E    
2.1 DT&E    
2.1.1.IFF  The IFF integration with the current SA aircraft platforms. This 
interrogation technology although successfully implemented in many 
SSR systems around the world, it is a new requirement for the SA DOD. 
The implementation might involve couple trial and error efforts.  
Schedule D&D and 
Industrialization  
2.2 OT&E    
2.2.1 Integration  There is a potential that a couple selected subsystem architectures 
entails new technology with no prior guidelines. Therefore, the 
compatibility, integration and testing of different software and hardware 
subsystems might involve trial and error.  
 
Schedule Industrialization  
2.2.2 Supply of 
Government 
Furnished 
Testing the radar requires supply of GFE such as mobile power 
generators. 
Programmatic Industrialization  
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There is a potential that there is incompatibility of communication 
standard and interfacing between the acquired radar and couple of SA 
DOD legacy communications links, which are expected to share data.  
 
 
Cost and schedule Commissioning 
Initial spares and 
repair parts 
   
3.1 Radar 
maintenance  
   
3.1.1 Antenna There is few potential manufactures of AESA within the SA, therefore 
spares availability and supply will be limited. 
Supportability Commissioning 





Cost Commissioning  
3.1.3 Maintenance 
personnel training 
Training maintenance personnel for radar based on new; state-of-the-art 
components such as solid-state transceivers radar may take some time.  
Cost and schedule Commissioning  
3.2 Software 
Maintenance 
   
3.2.1 Availability of 
software support 
Software-based subsystems such as radar processor and IFF fail 
constantly, and require on-demand maintenance support. Government 
may not have such support capability in-house, and contracting it out 
maybe costly. 
Cost and Supportability Commissioning 
3.3 Facilities 
maintenance 
The installation and maintenance of infrastructure that house the radar 
such as building, electrical, HVAC systems etc., may delay as it is 
supplied by Department of Public Works which SA DOD have not 
control over it. 
Schedule Industrialization and 
commissioning 
Requirement creep The client may change the scope of the requirement any point of the 
acquisition process.  
Cost and schedule Any phases 
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The first column assigns each risk, a risk identity number that can be used to 
reference the risk. The middle column provides a risk description, and the last column 
classifies each risk by a risk facet. 
c. Risk Analysis 
The analyses of the SSR risks identified in Table 7 are analyzed using risk 
analysis matrix shown in Figure 6 on page 38. The likelihood and the consequence level 
for each risk is predicted and assigned, as per the description of Table 3 and Table 4 
respectively. Table 3 and Table 4 are again shown again in this section as Table 10 and 
Table 11 for the purpose of facilitating the interpretation of Table 8. Then based on the 
combination of these two measures, the risk coordinated is created and mapped in the 
matrix. The position of the risk coordinate in the risk matrix determines whether the risk 
event will have a moderate or severe outcome if it occurs taking both likelihood and 
consequence levels. Table 8 and Figure 13 show this analysis as it is narrated.  
 
Table 10.   Risk Likelihood Values. Adapted from U.S. Department of Defense 
(2006). 
Value/level Likelihood Probability of occurrence 
1 Not likely ~10 
2 Low likely ~30 
3 Likely ~50 
4 Highly likely ~70 




Table 11.   Risk Consequence Values. Adapted from Rendon and Snider (2008). 
Value/Level Technical Performance Schedule Cost 
1 Minimal or no impact Minimal or no impact Minimal or no impact 
2 Minor reduction in technical for 
supportability, can be tolerated 
with little or no impact on 
program  
Able to meet key dates; 
Slip <=month(s) 
Budget increase or unit 
production cost increase; 
<= (1% of the budget) 
3 Moderate reduction in technical 
performance or supportability 
with little or no impact on 
program objectives 
Minor schedule slip; able 
to meet key milestones 
with no schedule float; 
Slip <=months(s); sub-
system slip>=months plus 
available float 
Budget increase or unit 
production cost increase; 
<=(5% of the budget) 
4 Significant degradation in 
technical performance or major 
shortfall in supportability might 
jeopardize program success. 
Program critical path 
affected; Slip <= months 
Budget increase or unit 
production cost increase; 
<=(10% of budget) 
5 Severe degradation in technical 
performance; cannot meet KPP or 
key technical/supportability 
threshold; will jeopardize 
program success 
 
Cannot meet key program 
milestone; Slip >=months 
Exceeds APB thresholds; 





Table 12.   Risk Analysis for the SSR Acquisition Program. 
Risk Identity  Likelihood level Consequence level Risk rating 
(Extracted from 
the risk matrix) 
1.1.1  (5) Near certainty due to 
the processing advantage 
offered by AESA antenna 
patterns for IFF purposes.  
 
(3) Moderate impact because if AESA technology cannot be obtained, 
IFF functionality can still be obtained by the existing current antenna 
architecture, just processing becomes complex or limited. 
Severe 
1.1.2 (5) Near certainty because 
there are currently limited 
radar antenna research 
organizations in SA. 
Therefore, most design 
level collaborations will 
only be found outside SA. 
 
(3) Moderate impact because if AESA design support cannot be 
secured, older antenna design can be selected. However, tradeoffs 
involving specific performance specifications at the design level will 
be made. 
Severe 
1.2.1 (4) Highly likely because 
AESA antenna works 





(3) Moderate because it might slightly increase the budget.  Moderate 
1.3.1 (4) Highly likely because 
most the manufacturing 
organization are 
migrating to SDR.  
 
(4) Major shortfall in supportability might affect availability during 
production and maintenance activities during operations. 
Severe  
2.1.1 (4) Highly likely due to 
the unviability of IFF 
experience within SA 
DOD.  
 
(2) Schedule can slip by few months if it takes longer to configure the 
IFF. However, IFF technology is not complex, anyone with electronic 
engineering design insight can configure it. 
Moderate 
2.2.1 (4) Highly likely because 
operating and 
configuration of any new 
(3) Minor schedule slip because some systems may require additional 
contract support. The contracting process may take longer but can be 
anticipated, and can be synchronized to milestones.  
Moderate 
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Risk Identity  Likelihood level Consequence level Risk rating 
(Extracted from 
the risk matrix) 
technology systems 
involve learning, and 
therefore is always 
coupled to uncertainty 
how long it will take.  
2.2.2 (5) Near certain because 
currently many radars 
requires auxiliary 
equipment, which cannot 
be procured before it is 
near certain that the 
program will be 
successful.  
(1) Minimal because GFE support can be formally requested from the 
operational units.  
Low 
2.2.3 (4) Highly likely because 
most there are legacy 
systems still operated by 
the SA DOD.  
 
(2) Minor because how legacy systems works is already well 
understood.  
Moderate 
3.1.1 (4) Highly likely because 
AESA uses different 
components than other 
older radar antennas.  
 
(4) Significant shortfall in supportability because there are few 
companies that operate AESA within SA, therefore spares should be 
imported. Maintenance plans will project high cost of operation.  
High 
3.1.2 (3) Likely because AESA 
works well with solid-
state transceivers.  
(2) Minor because it might slightly increase the budget.  Low 
3.1.3 (2) Low likelihood 
because most operators 
are young aged, familiar 
with software based 
system, therefore they 
will learn quickly. 
Furthermore, software 
systems are designed in 
such a way that it is easier 
to interact with.  
 
(2) Minor because there are few operators in the SA DOD, therefore 
not all of them can take time to learn the new systems. On-job training 
can also be facilitated.  
Low 
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Risk Identity  Likelihood level Consequence level Risk rating 
(Extracted from 
the risk matrix) 
 
 
3.2.1 (4) Highly likely because 





(4) Because software problems occurs constantly, and when they pile 
they can cause serious degradation in performance.  
Severe 
3.3 (5) Near certain because 
requesting a service from 




works has many clients as 
it supports other 
government departments. 
SA DOD programs might 
not be prioritized because 
it does not have an insight 
of how critical is it. 
(4) Program critical path may be affected because Industrialization and 
commissioning phase cannot be terminated before the installation of 
infrastructure is completed.  
Severe 
4 (2) Low likelihood 
because of the budget cuts 
within in the government 
departments. The client 
might assume that a 
change in a requirement 
will jeopardize future 
funding.  
(4) Critical path affected, and budget increase because this may involve 






Figure 13.  Risk Matrix for SSR Acquisition Program. 
The last column on Table 8 indicates that if according to the likelihood and 
consequence levels of the risk analysis, the risk coordinates are located at the red portion 
of the risk analysis matrix in Figure 13; the risk effectively has a severe impact. If the risk 
coordinates are located at the yellow portion, effectively the risk has moderate impact. 
However, if the risks coordinates are located at the green portion of the risk matrix, the 
risk has effectively a low impact. For example, a risk with risk identity 1.1.1 has a risk 
coordinates (5, 3), hence it is located on the red portion of risk matrix in Figure 13.  
d. Risk-Response Planning 
This section develops options, and determines the specific approach to address the 
specific risks identified in the Table 7. The objective is to identify those risks, and the 
associated program phase, that are possible to address using a selected contract-type. The 
resulting contract-types pattern is then compared to the contract-type strategy in Figure 
10. Table 9 provides the proposed risk response planning for each identified risks. 
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Table 13.   Risk Analysis for the SSR Acquisition Program. 
Risk Identity Planned mitigation (what, when, who, funding) Consequence type Impacted Life-cycle phase 
1.1.1 Antenna architecture Risk mitigation. Award the technology development 
contracts to expand the AESA research. Award CPIF 
contract-type to incentivize the schedule. 
Technical and schedule Concept 
1.1.2 Antenna architecture 
limitations 
Risk mitigation Award the technology development 
contracts to expand the AESA research. Award CPIF to 




Definition and D&D 
1.2.1 Transceiver 
architecture 
Risk mitigation & transfer. Award CPIF during the 
definition phase to incentivize the contractor to develop 
innovative solutions. Award FPI during Industrialization 
phase to motivate the contractor to develop cost effective 
manufacturing technologies. FFP will satisfactory during the 
production phase if the objective of obtaining better 
manufacturing methods during the Industrialization phase 
was achieved.  
 
Cost Definition, Industrialization 
and production  
1.3.1 Processor  Risk avoidance. This risk can be mitigated by delaying the 
program until the SDR technology is fully developed, and 





2.1.1IFF  Risk Mitigation. Award the CPAF, where the award fees can 
be used when the contractor achieved a specified schedule 
performance. 
Schedule D&D and Industrialization  
2.2.1 Integration  Risk mitigation. Award FPI during Industrialization phase to 
incentivize a specified schedule performance. 
 
Schedule Industrialization  
2.2.2 Supply of 
Government Furnished 
Equipment (GFE) 
Risk assumption. Establish contingency plans such as 
making requests of the required GFE from several 
government units. 
 
Programmatic Industrialization  
2.2.3 Interoperability  Risk assumption. Undertake a well-timed communication 
with the operating units that they prepare for the arrival of 
the new system. Preparations can include modifying the 
legacy systems, operating procedures etc. 
Cost and schedule Commissioning 
3.1.1 Antenna Risk transfer. Award an extended contract to the developer 
of the AESA to provide support during the commission 
phase. The selected contract-type should be a FFP.  
Supportability Commissioning 
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Risk Identity Planned mitigation (what, when, who, funding) Consequence type Impacted Life-cycle phase 
3.1.2 Transceiver Risk assumption. Advise the operating units to increase their 
budgets in order to cater for the additional energy 
requirement. 
Cost Commissioning  
3.1.3 Maintenance 
personnel training 
Risk transfer. Award an extended contract to the developer 
to provide training to the maintenance personnel during the 
commission phase. The selected contract-type should be a 
FFP. 
Cost and schedule Commissioning  
3.2.1 Availability of 
software support 
Risk assumption. Advise the operating units to increase their 
budgets in order to cater for the continuous software support. 
Cost and Supportability Commissioning 
3.3 Facilities maintenance Risk assumption. Forward a well-timed requirement to the 
DPW. 
 
Schedule Industrialization and 
commissioning 
Requirement creep Risk avoidance. If the nature of the additional or modified 
requirement is in such a manner that it is impossible to 
achieve overall planned performance objectives, these 
objective will be changed by, for example modifying a 
contract.  
Cost and schedule Any phases 
  70
e. Risk Monitoring and Control 
The risk monitoring and control will involve assessing the outcome of the risk 
mitigation plan by tracking the level of the risk as the acquisition program progresses. 
This will be achieved by documenting each of the identified risk discussed earlier, and 
the associated mitigation plan in the risk management plan. As it was mentioned in 
Chapter I and Chapter II, the risk management plan is to be treated as a living document 
which should be updated as the risk changes. Within the SA DOD, this process is catered 
for by including the risk management plan document as part of each baseline 
requirement, and it is treated as Category 1 element.  
D. SUMMARY OF THE ANALYSIS OF CURRENT SA DOD ACQUISITION 
PROGRAM 
Table 8 indicates several identified risks, in which selecting a contract-type can 
contribute in controlling or mitigating the risk. It should be noted that this is certain for 
each acquisition phase of the SA DOD acquisition process. In particular, for a selected 
acquisition program, the SSR program, the proposed contract-type per the acquisition 
phase corresponds to the proposed contract strategy in Figure 10. Figure 10 is again 




0 1 2 2a 3 3a 4
Concept Definition Design Development Industrialisation Production Commissioning
CPIF CPIF/CPAF CPFF/CPIF/FPEA/FPI FPI FFP FFP
 
Figure 14.  South African DOD Acquisition Process with a Proposed Contract-
type Strategy.  
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Risk 1.1.1 is predicted for the concept phase, and proposed contract-type 
mitigation plan is CPIF. Risk 1.1.2, and 1.1.2 are for the definition D&D phase, and 
similar, CPIF can be used as a mitigation plan at these phase. Furthermore, it is proposed 
that FPI contact-type is applicable to risk 1.2.1, which is further predicted for the 
Industrialization and production phase. CPAF is proposed for risk 2.1.1, which occurs at 
the D&D and Industrialization phase. Finally, risk 1.2.1 and 2.1.1, indicates that FFP can 
be selected for the purpose of mitigating the risks at production and commissioning 
phase.  
In concluding this chapter, the undertaken risk management process illustrated for 
the SSR, coupled with the use of contract-type as a mitigation plan addresses the research 
question presented in Chapter I. The research question addressed is, how can the 
contract-type based contracting strategy be implemented in mitigating program risks in 
the SA defense acquisition programs? Finally, the predicted risk consequence levels 
identified in the third column of Table 8 rationally address the research question; what 
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V. ASSESSMENT OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 
PROPOSED CONTRACT-TYPE STRATEGY AND PROGRAM 
SUCCESS  
The purpose of this section is to determine if a relationship exists between the 
incentive contracts and award fee contracts as recommended for the SA DOD, and the 
desired acquisition performance outcomes. The objective is to predict the success of the 
proposed contract-type structure in order to analyze and evaluate performance. The 
section will use selected scenarios from the U.S. DOD because these types of contracts 
are applied within their contracting environment (FAR, 2005). The qualitative analysis is 
provided. As it was mentioned in Chapter I, EVM is the quantitative method used to 
measure this kind of program performance and it provides better resolution on the results. 
The U.S. DOD programs selected are comparable in capability to the past and present SA 
DOD selected for analysis in two subsequent chapters, hence they are selected. The 
programs include the U.S. Army’s RAH-66 Comanche helicopter, the U.S. Air Force’s 
(USAF) F-22 fighter aircraft, and the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) AN/TPS-80 Ground/
Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR).  
A. RAH-66 COMANCHE HELICOPTER 
The objective of the RAH-66 Comanche helicopter program (Comanche) by the 
U.S. Army was to develop a capability to counter threats in the 1980s by, extending the 
capability of the Apache helicopter. It was expected to be the Army’s armed 
reconnaissance helicopter for the 21st century. Although the program experienced 
termination in 2004 after experiencing funding problems, changing requirements, and 
technology issues; it is comparable to SA DOD Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) program 
considered in Chapter III (Johnson & Birkler, 1996). Therefore, it will be used as a 
baseline to assess the probability of success of the proposed contracting strategy for the 
LUH program.  
In operation, the Comanche was intended to fly ahead of Apache to scout its 
targets, and conduct air-combat missions using guided bombs and missiles, and perform 
reconnaissance operations. Additional capabilities are advanced avionics and targeting 
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systems, improved engines for lift, lower detectability through low radar-cross-section 
area, stealth technologies, and minimal logistical burden (United States GAO, 1992).  
The Comanche program was initiated in 1982, and the technology development 
continued until 1988. In 1989, the program was tailored to two contractors who were 
expected to develop two prototypes for the purpose of developmental risk reduction. 
During this phase, the Comanche IPT identified of number of risks associated with the 
program. The overall technical risks that were included were increased weight of the 
aircraft, Mission Equipment Package (MEP), Software development, Integrated Logistic 
Support, Training, Propulsion and cost risks. The MEP and possibility of increased 
production unit cost provided greater risks in terms of probability of failure and 
consequence. For example, there was a risk associated with “Electro-Optical Target 
Acquisition Designation System, and Night Vision Piloting System may smear or bloom 
during weapons fire” (U.S. Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General, 2003, 
p. 27). The mitigation plan recommended “monitoring at system level for weapon flash 
and for bloom adverse effects during armament integration” (U.S. Department of Defense 
Office of the Inspector General, 2003, p. 27).  
Government Accountability Office (GAO, 2001) reported the following facts 
about the Comanche program’s first two phases, the research and development phases, 
just prior to the EMD phase, the total cost estimate had increased by $4.795 million, from 
$43,339,000.30 to $48,134,000.30. The schedule estimates had been revised, there was 
delay of 19 months to the total planned program schedule. The program had experienced 
couple of restructuring already. All these issues were attributed to the technical risks 
mentioned in the previous paragraph.  
In order to allow for further assessment of these risks, the project’s EMD and 
production phase undertook an evolutionary approach. The plan was to overlap between 
EMD and production. However, according to the GAO’s assessment study of possible 
restructuring of the program, the Comanche’s “acquisition schedule meant that 
production could have started before substantive technical risks were addressed” (GAO, 
1992, p. 29). 
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Incentives contracts were awarded during the EMD phase and LRIP of the 
Comanche program (Johnson & Birkler, 1996). The GAO study was undertaken in 2005 
on the assessment of the effect of incentives and award fees on acquisition outcomes. 
GAO (2005) found that by 2002 the Comanche program had experienced cost, technical 
and schedule issues despite 85% of award fees having been paid already. There was 
$202.5 million paid through 2004 since inception to LRIP. Specifically, technical MEP 
was the only aspect that was incentivized using award fees, whereby the risks dropped 
from high risk to moderate risk. The other aspects that were incentivized were cost and 
schedule. However, the cost had increased by 41.2% over the baseline, and schedule had 
extended by 14.8%. Figure 11 shows the risk matrix for the Comanche program as 
summarized by Comanche program manager in 2002 (GAO, 2005).  
According to the Comanche program manager, “the Comanche Program reported 
that there were no high risks, and 19 moderate risks carried at the program level” (GAO, 
2005; Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General, 2003, p. 7). This is 
illustrated in Figure 11. These risks could still lead to cost overruns and schedule slippage 
even if the award fees were paid, as it was already mentioned. Therefore, according was 
to the GAO, the Comanche program demonstrated that there is no positive correlation 
between the award-fees contracts and overall program performance (GAO, 2005; U.S. 
Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General, 2003).  
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Figure 15.  Comanche Program Level Risk Matrix. Source: U.S. Department of 
Defense Office of the Inspector General (2010). 
B. F-22 FIGHTER AIRCRAFT 
The USAF F-22 fighter aircraft program is comparable to the SA DOD Gripen 
and Hawk programs considered in Chapter III because it involved the revitalization of the 
respective DOD air superiority capability. Therefore, it will be used as a baseline to 
assess the probability of success of the proposed contracting strategy for the Gripen and 
Hawk program. The U.S. Air Force (USAF) F-22 fifth generation fighter aircraft program 
was officially started 1986, as the result of the requirement for a new air superiority 
fighter to replace F-15 and F-16 aircraft. The EMD phase was entered in 1991, and 
stretched over 11 years until 2002. The production started in 1999, and partially ran 
concurrently with the unfinished EMD. The aircraft was first delivered into service in 
2005, representing the FRP and achievement of Initial Operational Capability. Full 
Operational Capability was confirmed in December 2007. The production was stopped in 
2012 (Kato, 2012).  
The primary capability it provides is air superiority; additional capabilities are 
ground attack, electronic warfare, and signal intelligence. Furthermore, “the F-22 
incorporates stealth technology, super-cruise, thrust-vectoring for high maneuverability, 
and integrated avionics that fuse information from on-board and off-board sensors” 
(Gertler, 2013, p. 3).  
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In order to address the program total costs and technical risks during the early 
phases of the program, the U.S. DOD awarded two FFP contracts to two teams of 
contractors, with two companies per team. The objective was to provide a solution that 
would reduce the total program development, production, and operation costs. 
Furthermore; provide innovative solution on the development of airframes, engines, and 
avionics for a typical modern tactical fighter. Each team was expected to come up with 
better solutions to address these risks (Gertler, 2013).  
According to Johnson & Birkler (1996), during the EMD phase, the prime 
contractors were performing on USAF CPFF and CPAF. Risks addressed during the 
EMD phase are related to broad requirement and technology maturity. The following 
specific critical-technical areas were identified and addressed as risks that could have 
costs overrun and schedule delay consequence. All these risks were considered moderate, 
with the exception of engine and radar related risks which were high:  
 Airframe—Static and Fatigue Tests Completion Flight Test  
 Engine—Redesigned Engine Ground Test and First Flight Engine 
Delivery  
 Low Observables—Pole Model and Flight Testing  
 Radar—Hardware and Software Flight Testing  
 Passive Surveillance and Electronic Warfare—Hardware and Software 
Flight Testing  
 Sensor Control/Sensor Fusion/Pilot Interface—Hardware and Software 
Flight  
 Flight Control/Vehicle Management—Early Flight Testing  
There was no best risk mitigation approach to risk areas identified as high risk. 
The IPT decided to assume the risks. This would lead to accepting reduced F-22 
performance, with the slip in the schedule, or some combination of both. However, even 
if performance was reduced in the specified risk areas, it would still represent a major 
increase in military capability (Office of the Under Secretary Of Defense for Acquisition 
& Technology, 1995).  
  78
The contract-type awarded during the production of F-22 was the hybrid of CPFF, 
FPIF, FPEA and FFP. The EVM was used to track performance for the CPFF contracts. 
The incentivized contract elements included number of produced aircraft per batch for 
different lots. There were further specific tasks involved within the contract, such as 
Modernization of Laboratory Infrastructure at the contractor production site, maturation 
of Reliability and Maintainability programs, squadron level maintenance support (U. S. 
Department of Defense, 2010).  
According to the GAO study undertaken in 2005 on the assessment of the overall 
effect of incentives and award fees on acquisition outcomes, the F-22 program had 
experienced cost increases, and development delays up to the point when the study was 
conducted. The prime systems contractors had received 91% ($848.7 million) of the 
award fee made available to that date. The significant aspect that was incentives, as it was 
mentioned was the technological innovation. However, the cost had increased by 47.3% 
over the baseline, and schedule had extended by 13.3% (GAO, 2005). This was despite 
the fact that there were relatively few elements classified as high risk throughout the 
acquisition of the F-22, in that the program was considered for restructuring or 
cancellation. 
C. AN/TPS-80 GROUND/AIR TASK ORIENTED RADAR 
The AN/TPS-80 G/ATOR is the program that has recently passed through the 
EMD phase (Milestone C) and entered the LRIP, for the acquisition of the USMC mobile 
multi-role radar, and ground weapons locating radar capability. This integrated radar 
achieve the proposed capabilities by performing three radar type tasks in one system: air 
surveillance, air defense, and ATC. It will replace five USMC radars, the AN/TPS-63 air 
defense radar, AN/TPS-73 air traffic control radar, AN/MPQ-62 short range air defense 
radar, AN/TPQ-46 counter fire and target acquisition radar. It will further complement 
AN/TP-59 long-range radar. The program is analogous to SA DOD SSR program (U.S. 
Marine Corps Concepts and Programs, 2015).  
The program implements the evolutionary acquisition approach, in that the 
production will be divided into four blocks. Each block will produce radar’s slightly 
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unique characteristics, in lots format. For example, Block 1 will produce basic radar 
equipment which supports air defense and air surveillance capability. Block 2 will 
produce radar with software that performs the missions of ground counter-battery and fire 
control. The last defined block will provide the expedition airport surveillance radar 
capabilities (U.S. Department of Defense of the Office Inspector General, 2015). 
The risks addressed during the EMD phase consist of requirement maturity risk, 
costs risk and technology maturity risks. On the requirement risk area, according to 
Program Executive Office Land Systems (2012) the G/ATOR system was reported that it 
does not meet the reliability requirement due to the fact that it fails repeatedly during 
operations. This risk has been considered low, and it was carried through to the LRIP 
after the approval of TEMP at Milestone C by the MDA (Program Executive Office Land 
Systems, 2012).  
The costs risk involves the high costs of manufacturing process associated with 
the following elements, the production and assembly of air ducts that provides precise 
mounting and cooling of the transceiver modules and antenna array elements, transceiver 
modules requires expensive material and hermetic sealing which reduces yield, and 
circulator isolator boards required for transceiver modules requires a multiple yield 
manufacturing process and thus expensive. The risk mitigation adopted by the IPT for 
costs risks was conducting an additional research to devise alternatives manufacturing 
processes. The initiative included involving the small businesses for the purpose of 
expanding the innovative solution base. The initiative was called Small Business 
Innovative Research (SBIR). The overall solution adopted included the transition from 
the Gallium Arsenide (GaAs) based transceivers to next generation Gallium Nitride 
(GaN) based transceivers. Although it is still a new concept, GaN transceivers works 
better, cost less, weigh less and consume less power (Program Executive Office Land 
Systems, 2012).  
The technology risk follow-on the cost risk in that it involves the reliability 
challenges of producing GaN transceivers. The testing process of GaN transceivers is yet 
to mature. Although not yet implemented, the risk mitigation plans will include SBIR to 
devise further risk reduction plans for the production phase. This risk has been considered 
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low, and it was carried through to the LRIP after the approval of TEMP at Milestone C 
by the MDA (Program Executive Office Land Systems, 2012).  
The G/ATOR program was considered by GAO a low-risk program because it 
achieved the expected acquisition performance outcome. The GAO (2016) states that the 
program has remained on schedule and decreased the estimated total program cost by 
more than 15%. The phases prior the EMD were completed in 66 months, and the EMD 
phase in 138 months. The early phases had the total costs of $1,572.7 million. The total 
program cost at the end of 2015 was $2,775.4 million, with the major part spent during 
the EMD phase. The program had estimated cost re-baselined only once in 2010 when 
there were cost overruns of $14 million, however overall savings of $40 million are 
expected in production and deployment phase. The FRP are going to be finished in 2020 
(GAO, 2016). As per the Selected Acquisition Report of the program published in 2015, 
the program awarded FPI (Firm Target), FFP, and CPIF during the EMD phase (U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2015b). 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provided a qualitative analysis of some of the U.S. DOD acquisition 
programs analogous to SA DOD programs presented in Chapter IV. The U.S. DOD 
programs selected applied contract-type as part of their contracting strategy. The purpose 
was to establish whether there is a correlation between the contract-type strategies based 
on incentives fees and award fees and acquisition program success. The analysis of the 
U.S. DOD Comanche program, similar to the SA DOD LUH program indicates that even 
though 85% of the available award fees were paid, the program was canceled.  
The analysis of the U.S. DOD F-22 program, similar to SA DOD Gripen and 
Hawk program, indicated the following. The F-22 program experienced some increase in 
costs and development delays even with the use of award fees. The incentives fees were 
instrumental in managing the technological innovation. The incentive fees contracts 
further contributed in mitigating risks during the production phase. Therefore, despite the 
unsuccessful outcome of the award fees and success of incentive fees, the deployment of 
F-22 aircraft still represented a major increase in military capability. 
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The incentive fees, together with fixed contracts were awarded during the EMD 
phase of the G/ATOR program, which is similar to SSR program. The acquisition 
performance objectives were achieved thus far in that the program remain on schedule, 
and the total estimated program costs decreased. The conclusion from the analysis of the 
three U.S. DOD program suggests that, the Comanche program was unsuccessful, the F-
22 program was partially successful, and the G/ATOR program is progressing on target. 
Therefore, from risk management perspective, the application of award fee and incentives 
fees contract-type is not inconsequential, but is manageable.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The purpose of this project was to explore the possibility of applying the contract-
type strategy in order to mitigate acquisition program risks for the SA DOD. The focus 
was on cost overruns and schedule slippage risks. The objective was to propose a 
standard contract-type based strategy for various phases of the acquisition process of the 
SA DOD. The strategy is based on understanding relationship between the requirement 
certainty and the risk.  
The objective of this project was achieved through addressing the following 
research questions how can the contract-type based contracting strategy be implemented 
in mitigating program risks in the SA defense acquisition programs, should this strategy 
be implemented in order to avoid acquisition program risks that lead to costs overruns 
and schedule delays, and what are the risk consequences if this strategy is not applied? 
The research began by conducting a literature overview on risk management 
processes commonly applied in the U.S. defense acquisition programs. The literature 
overview then covered some important contract management principles that are 
applicable to the defense acquisition such as selecting a contract-type, and how these are 
used to balance the risk between the stakeholders in the acquisition program. This process 
also compared the risk management, and contract management approaches of the U.S. 
DOD and SA DOD, and some underlying factors that influence the application of these 
processes, such as political and cultural backgrounds. The U.S. contract management 
guiding principles are contained within the FAR, while SA DOD are contained within the 
PPPFA. These agency specific regulations for the SA DOD, such as DAP 1000 and A-
PRAC-1034, are derived from the PPPFA framework.  
Defense acquisition frameworks were introduced, for the purpose of providing a 
foundation for the proposed contract-type strategy. U.S. DOD acquisition framework, as 
contained in the U.S. DOD Directive 5000.2 was introduced first because in literature and 
in practice, there is research conducted that relates to using a contract-type strategy. The 
SA DOD acquisition process as contained in DAP 1000 was introduced later, because in 
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subsequent chapters this process is repeatedly used to test the proposed contract-type 
strategy as a hypothesis. 
A. FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
The proposed contract-type strategy for the SA DOD was introduced in Chapter 
III. The strategy, unlike in the provision of PPPFA and A-PRAC-1034, considers the use 
of incentive-based and award fee contracts in order to address the costs and schedule risk 
encountered in some phases of the acquisition programs. The strategy suggested that 
during the concept phase, CPIF contracts are appropriate, as the requirement is still broad 
and uncertain, risk is high, and therefore incentives should be used to motivate the 
contractors to achieve cost savings and performance. During the definition phase, CPIF 
can be used to incentivize cost savings, and CPAF can be used to promote better 
performance. Hybrid of CPFF, CPIF, FPEA and FFI contract-type are recommended for 
D&D phase as this phase include a various development activities that are of different 
complexity. FPI contract-type is recommended for the Industrialization phase because 
although the solution is proven, innovation still need to be incentivized to achieve cost 
effective manufacturing processes, and required schedule performance. FFP contracts are 
appropriate during the production and commissioning phase because the requirement is 
well known, and risk is low.  
The analysis of three past SA DOD program in Chapter IV indicted the following. 
Part of the issues encountered during the LUH, Gripen and Hawk programs are the 
deviation of the actual costs and schedule from planned objectives from D&D phase to 
commissioning phase of the programs. There was a limited use of incentive-based 
contract-types to achieve cost and schedule objectives. Most issues experienced 
downstream, are due to risks not identified upstream. Finally, if the incentive-based and 
award fee contract-type strategy similar to the one proposed in Chapter III was selected, 
risk that results in cost overruns and schedule delays could have been avoided. This is the 
rationale that this strategy should be implemented in order to indirectly avoid overall 
program risks, and therefore improve performance. 
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The application of the risk management process, to one of current SA DOD 
programs, the SSR program found that it is possible to use contract-type strategy as a risk 
mitigation plan for some of the predicted risks throughout all phases of the acquisition 
process. Actually, contract-type risk mitigation plan for the SSR program corresponds to 
the proposed contract-type strategy in Chapter III. It was concluded that this process 
indicates, how a contract-type based risk mitigation strategy would be applied to the SA 
DOD acquisition, and the risk consequences if this strategy is not applied.  
The analysis of three U.S. DOD acquisition programs was conducted with the 
purpose of assessing if there is a relationship between an award fee and incentives fees, 
and acquisition program success as proposed for the SA DOD. It was concluded from the 
analysis that from risk management perspective, the application of award fee and 
incentives fees contract-type is not inconsequential, but the risks are manageable.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY  
This project did not cover significant, overarching facts that pertain to the SA 
DOD acquisition environment. This is because of the limited amount of data from the SA 
DOD acquisition programs available in open literature, and the difficult and involving 
process required in accessing such data from relevant authorities. Therefore, there are 
several factors influencing the implementation of the recommended contract-type 
strategy that were not addressed by this project. These factors require to be deservedly 
explored should such data become accessible. 
The analysis of the past SA DOD program did not cover the precise acquisition 
performance outcomes between the concept phase and definition phase, and D&D and 
commissioning phase. For example for cost and schedule performance, an overall cost 
and schedule were not presented into actual outcome per phase. The information on the 
actual spending per year (or per phase), number of years taken for each phase, and actual 
number of contracts and contract-type awarded for each phase was not obtained. Only 
overarching information was analyzed. If this low level information is obtained in the 
future, it would be beneficial to perform a further analysis as it might reveal better 
resolution to the answer for the research question, should the contract-type based risk 
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management strategy be implemented in order to avoid acquisition program risks that 
lead to costs overruns and schedule delays? 
It would be beneficial as well if the proposed contract-type strategy could be 
tested in more than one acquisition program that are at different phases of the acquisition 
process. Contrary to this project where an analysis was only performed for one program, 
the SSR program, which is in the concept phase. Testing the strategy with one distinct 
program per phase, with the program being at that particular phase, will provide a better 
resolution of the feasibility. The strategy may also be tested on procurement of COTS 
projects, and service acquisitions.  
Further studies that may benefit this project are as follows, the implementation of 
the EVMS in the SA DOD acquisition environment in order to manage deviations 
between technical, cost and schedule performance, feasibility study involving adapting 
regulations such as PPPFA and PFMA; the directive documents such as A-PRAC-1034 to 
cater for the incentive-based and award contracts, and effect of the SA defense industrial 
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